jueves, 24 de febrero de 2011

War, Martial Law, and the Economic Crisis



Excerpt from "The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of the XXI Century"
by Peter Dale Scott


The following is an excerpt of a chapter by Peter Dale Scott from the new book by Global Research Publishers, ``The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of the XXI Century.``

The Global
Economic Crisis

Michel Chossudovsky
Andrew G. Marshall (editors)

Help us get the word out, ``like`` the book on Facebook, comment, and share with friends!

The U.S. Treasury’s Financial Bailout
The bailout measures of late 2008 may have consequences at least as grave for an open society as the response to 9/11 in 2001. Many members of Congress felt coerced at the time into voting against their inclinations, and the normal procedures for orderly consideration of a bill were dispensed with.

The excuse for bypassing normal legislative procedures was the existence of an emergency. But one of the most reprehensible features of the legislation, that allowed Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to permit bailed-out institutions to use public money for exorbitant salaries and bonuses, was inserted by Paulson after the immediate crisis had passed.

According to Congressman Peter Welch (D-Vermont) the bailout bill originally called for a cap on executive salaries, but Paulson changed the requirement at the last minute. Welch and other members of Congress were enraged by "news that banks getting taxpayer-funded bailouts are still paying exorbitant salaries, bonuses, and other benefits."[1] In addition, as the Associated Press reported in October 2008, "Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y. questioned allowing banks that accept bailout bucks to continue paying dividends on their common stock. ‘There are far better uses of taxpayer dollars than continuing dividend payments to shareholders,’ he said."[2]

Even more reprehensible is the fact that after the bailouts, Paulson and the Treasury Department refused to provide details of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) spending of hundreds of billions of dollars, while the New York Federal Reserve refused to provide information about its own bailout (using government-backed loans) that amounted to trillions. This lack of transparency was challenged by Fox TV in a FOIA suit against the Treasury Department, and a suit by Bloomberg News against the Fed.[3]

The financial bailout legislation of September 2008 was only passed after members of both Congressional houses were warned that failure to act would threaten civil unrest and the imposition of martial law.

U.S. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., and U.S. Rep. Brad Sherman, D-Calif., both said U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson brought up a worst-case scenario as he pushed for the Wall Street bailout in September. Paulson, former Goldman Sachs CEO, said that might even require a declaration of martial law, the two noted.[4]

Here are the original remarks by Senator Inhofe:

Speaking on Tulsa Oklahoma’s 1170 KFAQ, when asked who was behind threats of martial law and civil unrest if the bailout bill failed, Senator James Inhofe named Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson as the source. "Somebody in D.C. was feeding you guys quite a story prior to the bailout, a story that if we didn’t do this we were going to see something on the scale of the depression, there were people talking about martial law being instituted, civil unrest... who was feeding you guys this stuff?," asked host Pat Campbell. "That’s Henry Paulson," responded Inhofe. "We had a conference call early on, it was on a Friday I think – a week and half before the vote on Oct. 1. So it would have been the middle... what was it – the 19th of September, we had a conference call. In this conference call – and I guess there’s no reason for me not to repeat what he said, but he said – he painted this picture you just described. He said, ‘This is serious. This is the most serious thing that we faced.’"[5]

Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA 27th District) reported the same threat on the Congressional floor:

The only way they can pass this bill is by creating a panic atmosphere... Many of us were told that the sky would fall... A few of us were even told that there would be martial law in America if we voted no. That’s what I call fear-mongering, unjustified, proven wrong.[6]

So it is clear that threats of martial law were used to get this reprehensible bailout legislation passed. It also seems clear that Congress was told of a threat of martial law, not itself threatened. It is still entirely appropriate to link such talk to the Army’s rapid moves at the time to redefine its role as one of controlling the American people, not just protecting them. In a constitutional polity based on balance of powers, we have seen the emergence of a radical new military power that is as yet completely unbalanced.

Continuity of Operations (COOP)

The Army’s New Role in 2001: Not Protecting American Society, but Controlling It. This new role for the Army is not wholly unprecedented. The U.S. military had been training troops and police in "civil disturbance planning" for the last three decades. The master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, or "Operation Garden Plot," was developed in 1968 in response to the major protests and disturbances of the 1960s.

But on January 19, 2001, on the last day of the Clinton administration, the U.S. Army promulgated a new and permanent Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program. It encapsulated its difference from the preceding, externally oriented Army Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution System (ASRRS) as follows:

a. In 1985, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the Army Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution System (ASRRS) to ensure the continuity of essential Army missions and functions.

ASRRS doctrine was focused primarily on a response to the worst case 1980’s threat of a massive nuclear laydown on CONUS as a result of a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

b. The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union significantly reduced the probability of a major nuclear attack on CONUS but the probability of other threats has increased. Army organizations must be prepared for any contingency with a potential for interruption of normal operations.

To emphasize that Army continuity of operations planning is now focused on the full all-hazards threat spectrum, the name "ASRRS" has been replaced by the more generic title "Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program.[7]

This document embodied the secret Continuity of Government (COG) planning conducted secretly by Rumsfeld, Cheney and others through the 1980s and 1990s.[8] This planning was initially for continuity measures in the event of a nuclear attack, but soon called for suspension of the Constitution, not just "after a nuclear war" but for any "national security emergency". This was defined in Reagan’s Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, as "any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States." The effect was to impose on domestic civil society the extreme measures once planned for a response to a nuclear attack from abroad.[9] In like fashion, ARR 500-3 Regulation clarified that it was a plan for "the execution of mission-essential functions without unacceptable interruption during a national security or domestic emergency."

Donald Rumsfeld, who as a private citizen had helped author the COG planning, promptly signed and implemented the revised ARR 500-3. Eight months later, on 9/11, Cheney and Rumsfeld implemented COG, a significant event of which we still know next to nothing.[10] What we do know is that plans began almost immediately – as foreseen by COG planning the 1980s – to implement warrantless surveillance and detention of large numbers of civilians, and that in January 2002 the Pentagon submitted a proposal for deploying troops on American streets.[11]

Then in April 2002, Defense officials implemented a plan for domestic U.S. military operations by creating a new U.S. Northern Command (CINC-USNORTHCOM) for the continental United States.[12] In short, what were being implemented were the most prominent features of the COG planning which Oliver North had worked on in the 1980s.


"Deep Events" and Changes of Party in the White House

Like so many other significant steps since World War Two towards a military-industrial state, the Army’s Regulation 500-3 surfaced in the last days of a departing administration (in this case the very last day). It is worth noticing that, ever since the 1950s, dubious events – of the unpublic variety I have called deep events – have marked the last months before a change of party in the White House. These deep events have tended to a) constrain the incoming president, if he is a Democrat or, alternatively, b) to pave the way for the incomer, if he is a Republican.

Consider, in the first category, the following (when a Republican was succeeded by a Democrat):

– In December 1960 the CIA secured approval for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and escalated events in Laos into a crisis for which the Joint Chiefs proposed sending 60 000 troops. These events profoundly affected President Kennedy’s posture towards Cuba and Indochina.

– In 1976 CIA Director George H.W. Bush installed an outside Team B intelligence unit to enlarge drastically estimates of the Soviet threat to the United States, eventually frustrating and reversing presidential candidate Jimmy Carter’s campaign pledge to cut the U.S. defense budget.[13]

Equally important were events in the second category (when a Democrat was succeeded by a Republican):

- In late 1968 Kissinger, while advising the Johnson administration, gave secret information to the Nixon campaign that helped Nixon to obstruct the peace agreement in Vietnam that was about to be negotiated at the peace talks then taking place in Paris. (According to Seymour Hersh, "The Nixon campaign, alerted by Kissinger to the impending success of the peace talks, was able to get a series of messages to the Thieu government" in Saigon, making it clear that a Nixon presidency would offer a better deal. This was a major factor in securing the defeat of Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey.[14] Kissinger was not the kind of person to have betrayed his president on his own personal initiative. At the time Nixon’s campaign manager, John Mitchell (one of the very few in on the secret), told Hersh, "I thought Henry [Kissinger] was doing it because Nelson [Rockefeller] wanted him to. Nelson asked Henry to help and he did."[15]

- In 1980 the so-called October Surprise, with the help of people inside the CIA, helped ensure that the Americans held hostage in Iran would not be returned before the inauguration of Reagan. This was a major factor in securing the defeat of incumbent Jimmy Carter.[16] Once again, the influence of the Rockefellers can be discerned. A CIA officer later reported hearing Joseph V. Reed, an aide to David Rockefeller, comment in 1981 to William Casey, the newly installed CIA Director, about their joint success in disrupting Carter’s plans to bring home the hostages.[17]

Both the financial bailout, extorted from Congress and the escalated preparations for martial law can be seen as transitional events of the first category. Whatever the explanations for their timing, they constrained Obama’s freedom to make his own policies. Moreover they have the consequence of easing this country into unforeseen escalations of the Afghan war.

The Intensive Quiet Preparations for Martial Law

Let us deal first with the preparations for martial law. In late September 2008, at the height of the financial meltdown, The Army Times announced the redeployment of an active Brigade Army Team from Iraq to America, in a new mission that "may become a permanent part of the active Army":

The 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team has spent 35 of the last 60 months in Iraq patrolling in full battle rattle, helping restore essential services and escorting supply convoys.

Now they’re training for the same mission – with a twist – at home.

Beginning Oct. 1 for 12 months, the 1st BCT will be under the day-to-day control of U.S. Army North, the Army service component of Northern Command, as an on-call federal response force for natural or manmade emergencies and disasters, including terrorist attacks… After 1st BCT finishes its dwell-time mission, expectations are that another, as yet unnamed, active-duty brigade will take over and that the mission will be a permanent one... They may be called upon to help with civil unrest and crowd control.[18]

This announcement followed by two weeks the talk of civil unrest and martial law that was used to panic the Congress into passing Paulson’s bailout legislation. Not only that, the two unprecedented events mirror each other: the bailout debate anticipated civil unrest and martial law, while the announced positioning of an active Brigade Combat Team on U.S. soil anticipated civil unrest (such as might result from the bailout legislation).

Then on December 17, 2008, U.S. Northern Command chief General Renuart announced that "the US military plans to mobilize thousands of troops to protect Washington against potential terrorist attack during the inauguration of president-elect Barack Obama."[19]

The U.S. Army War College also raised the possibility of the U.S. Army being used to control civil unrest, according to the Phoenix Business Journal:

A new report by the U.S. Army War College talks about the possibility of Pentagon resources and troops being used should the economic crisis lead to civil unrest, such as protests against businesses and government or runs on beleaguered banks.

"Widespread civil violence inside the United States would force the defense establishment to reorient priorities in extremis to defend basic domestic order and human security," said the War College report.

The study says economic collapse, terrorism and loss of legal order are among possible domestic shocks that might require military action within the U.S.[20]

It is clear that there has been a sustained move in the direction of martial law preparations, a trend that has been as continuous as it has been unheralded. Senator Leahy was thus right to draw our attention to it on September 29, 2006, in his objections to the final form of the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, which gave the president increased power to call up the National Guard for law enforcement:

It... should concern us all that the Conference agreement includes language that subverts solid, longstanding Posse Comitatus statutes that limit the military’s involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it easier for the President to declare martial law. There is good reason for the constructive friction in existing law when it comes to martial law declarations.[21]

This quiet agglomeration of military power has not "just growed", like Topsy, through inadvertence. It shows sustained intention, even if no one has made a public case for it.


For more from this chapter, click here.
NOTES

1. WCAX, Burlington, Vermont, http://www.wcax.com/Global/story.asp?S= 9567271, 22 December 2008; Cf. CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/27423117, 30 October 2008: " ‘You can get paid $30 million under this program’, says Michael Kesner, who heads Deloitte Consulting executive compensation practice, ‘There’s no limit on what you can get paid.’ "
2. John Dunbar, AP, http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/081025/meltdown_evolving_bailout.html, 25 October 2007.
3. David Hirst, "Fox Joins Battle cry for Details of US Bail-out", BusinessDay, http://www.businessday.com.au/business/fox-joins-battle-cry-for-details-of-us-bailout-20081223-74eh.html?page=-1, 24 December 2008.
4. Mike Sunnucks, "Ariz. Police say they are Prepared as War College warns Military must prep for Unrest; IMF warns of Economic Riots", Phoenix Business Journal, http://phoenix.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2008/12/15/daily34.html, 17 December 2008.
5. 1170 KFAQ, "Paulson Was Behind Bailout Martial Law Threat", Blacklisted News, http://www.blacklistednews.com/news-2367-0-13-13--.html, 23 November 2008.
6. Rep. Brad Sherman, in the House, 8:07 EST PM, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HaG9d_4zij8&NR=1, 2 October 2008; Rep. Sherman later issued the following clarification: "I have no reason to think that any of the leaders in Congress who were involved in negotiating with the Bush Administration regarding the bailout bill ever mentioned the possibility of martial law – again, that was just an example of extreme and deliberately hyperbolic comments being passed around by members not directly involved in the negotiations." See Rep. Sherman, Alex Jones Show, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bH1mO8qhCs.
7. Army Regulation 500-3, "Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources", Army Continuity Of Operations (COOP) Program, http://www.wikileaks.org/leak/us-army-reg-500-3-continuity-2001.pdf, emphasis added; Tom Burghardt, "Militarizing the ‘Homeland’ in Response to the Economic and Political Crisis: NORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support", Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10534, 11 October 2008.
8. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2007, p. 183-87; James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York, Viking, 2004, p. 138-45.
9. Peter Dale Scott, Road to 9/11, op. cit., p. 183-87.
10. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p. 38, 326; 555, footnote 9; Peter Dale Scott, Road to 9/11, op. cit., p. 228-30.
11. Ritt Goldstein, "Foundations are in Place for Martial Law in the US", Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/ 2002/07/27/10274974183 39.html, 27 July 2002.
12. Peter Dale Scott, Road to 9/11, op. cit., p. 240-41.
13. Ibid., p. 60-61.
14. Robert Parry, "Henry Kissinger, Eminence Noire", ConsortiumNews, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/122808.html, 28 December 2008: "Kissinger... – while serving as a peace-talk adviser to the Johnson administration – made obstruction of the peace talks possible by secretly contacting people working for Nixon, according to Seymour Hersh’s 1983 book, The Price of Power", p. 21.
15. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power, 1983, p. 18; Jim Hougan, Spooks: The Haunting of America, New York, William Morrow, 1978, p. 435: "Kissinger, married to a former Rockefeller aide, owner of a Georgetown mansion whose purchase was enabled only by Rockefeller gifts and loans, was always the protégé of his patron, Nelson R[ockefeller], even when he wasn’t directly employed by him."
16. Peter Dale Scott, Road to 9/11, op. cit., p. 93-118.
17. Ibid. p. 82-87, 91, 104-05.
18. Gina Cavallaro, "Brigade Homeland Tours Start Oct. 1", Army Times, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/09/army_homeland _090708w/, 30 September 2008; Michel Chossudovsky, "Pre-election Militarization of the North American Homeland, US Combat Troops in Iraq Repatriated to ‘Help with Civil Unrest’", Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php? context= va&aid=10341, 26 September 2008.
19. AFP, Agence France-Presse, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iTBOy3JF8pVAthIthq8C1NrMf4Cg, 17 De- cember 2008.
20. Mike Sunnucks, "Ariz. Police say they are Prepared as War College warns Military must prep for Unrest; IMF warns of Economic Riots", Phoenix Business Journal, http://phoenix.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2008/12/ 15/daily34.html, 17 December 2008.
21. Remarks Of Sen. Patrick Leahy, "National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2007 Conference Report", Congressional Record, http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200609/092906b.html, 29 September 2006.


Peter Dale Scott is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Peter Dale Scott

Gaddafi goes Tiananmen By Pepe Escobar


"The unity of China was more important than the people of Tiananmen Square."

"It's impossible for the youth to follow anyone else. If not Gaddafi, who else would they follow? Somebody with a beard?"
Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, February 22

Talk about The King's Speech; this was The African King of Kings' Speech. A furious, delirious, possessed, prophet-as-psychopath Muammar Gaddafi may have improvised the ultimate lunatic rant to send chills down the spines of the Libyan people and the whole world - delivered right from the family house bombed by the United


What else is new? After all, Gaddafi is a master of the politics of fear. He threatened those opposing his 41-year rule with the death penalty; called them "greasy rats" and drug addicts; and victims of a conspiracy by foreigners, the US, al-Qaeda, Britain, Italy, satellite television and hallucinogenic drugs. He rallied his supporters to "cleanse" the nation "house by house", inspired by his unsavory collection of deadly offspring. One could not help being reminded of the last days of Saddam Hussein before he was bombed by another US president, George W Bush.

Abdulmoneim al-Honi, who resigned as Libya's representative to the Arab League, says Gaddafi is barricaded at the Bab al-Azizia base. Only two other bases may be under his full control, al-Saadi and Sirte; "The rest of the country is controlled by the youth." These are the ones Gaddafi calls "rats". There's no sign these democracy-addicted rodents will be intimidated, even with the prospect of facing - again - squadrons of MiG-23 jets, piloted by Ukrainian, Serbian and Pakistani mercenaries, and equipped with rockets and heavy machine guns. The stage is set for the final showdown.

The rant may well have been Gaddafi's Hitler moment - with the German leader's consort Eva Braun played by his Ukrainian nurse. He evoked the sinister option of Tiananmen - when in 1989 China cracked down on protesters - to contain a "chaos" his own regime's shoot-to-kill fabricated; the mirror image of this chaos is the revenge of the regime itself for being unraveled by peaceful protests. Nothing his "modernizer" son Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi proposes to the nation will mollify the resolve of the protesters. (For the Gaddafi offspring power struggle, see this WikiLeaks cable.)

The blood on the regime's hands as well as the humbling courage of the Libyan people, are self-evident. The self-described "Liberated Eastern Region of Libya" - with the people in Benghazi, for instance, organizing themselves in civic committees - and great swathes of southern Libya have already fallen; the Gaddafi state does not apply anymore.



The capital Tripoli - crammed with pro-regime forces - seems at least temporarily to have been bludgeoned into silence. Now two intertwined questions are absolutely key. Will the major tribes go after Gaddafi in the next few hours and days? And what about the army - itself divided along complex tribal lines?

In his 1976 Green Book - pages of which he made sure to read during Tuesday's rant - Gaddafi talks about erasing tribalism; what he actually did was to apply divide and rule. Son Khamis al-Gaddafi's 32nd Brigade remains very much loyalist. Most eastern brigades have dissolved. But virtually no one knows how the others will react once Gaddafi orders them to shoot civilians en masse. That's why Gaddafi needs a tsunami of sub-Saharan Africa mercenaries.

Mercenaries or scapegoats?
There was a time when black Africans would cross the Libyan desert for days in overcrowded trucks just to find a job. The other, nasty side of this internal - economic - migration is black Africans now chased in Libya as mercenaries. Al-Jazeera has exhibited the passports of over 100 mercenaries from Niger, Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia who have been shooting anti-Gaddafi protesters to kill, and were apprehended in southern Libya. Ads in Guinea and Nigeria are offering would-be mercenaries a hefty US$2,000 a day. And according to tweets, mercenaries now stand at the entrances of Tripoli preventing people from coming into the capital.

The other side of the coin is the United Nations' High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) desperate for the fate of refugees and asylum seekers in Libya - "Somalis, Eritreans, Ethiopians", according to spokesperson Laura Boldrini, "who risk becoming scapegoats".

Amnesty International is asking the Italian government to suspend its 2008 immigration deal with Libya. This is a Gaddafi-Silvio Berlusconi pact, according to which Libya gets 5 billion euros (US$6.8 billion) over 20 years as reparation for the Italy's colonialism years, and Libya promises to repress the flux of illegal immigration to southern Europe. No one knows how "Rubygate"-embattled Berlusconi will react to that request; especially now that Gaddafi called his close pal to say "everything is fine" in Libya.

How to prevent a civil war
A huge question is whether Gaddafi will have enough support to try to pull a Saddam 1991, post-Gulf War, when Iraq's ruler unleashed Republican Guard tanks and helicopter gunships against civilians in Najaf, Basra and across the Shi'ite south (Washington looked the other way). As much as Sunnis supported Saddam's massacre in 1991, no one knows whether any tribe would support a Gaddafi massacre in 2011; moreover, he cannot count on a Sunni-against-Shi'ite war.

What Gaddafi will do is to go for Benghazi with a vengeance. So it's up to the protesters there to lay their hands on some serious heavy weapons and come up with an organized resistance strategy. They may be able to resist for a while - as the only possible solution to avoid a bloodbath has to be tackled by the UN; to declare a no-fly zone, which would wreak havoc on the regime's push to supply its mercenaries, and even abort a possible offensive against Benghazi.

In parallel, that could provoke the defection of more tribes and more officers in military bases. The secret of success would have to be a UN resolution - not by any means a North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention, which would only play right into Gaddafi's narrative of "foreigners, the US and TV channels" trying to re-colonize Libya.

Prospects are not very encouraging, considering the UN Security Council's bland statement condemning the violence against civilians. Libya's deputy UN ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, who has called for Gaddafi to go, at least kept a brave face, saying this was "a good step to stopping the bloodshed".

Watch King Abdullah
Next is the black gold angle. Investment strategists, such as Arjuna Mahendran from HSBC, are already worried about oil prices hitting "$120 a barrel in the next three months". Correction; it could be next week, or by early March, as the price of Brent crude for April delivery was already at $106.81 this Tuesday in London. Nobuo Tanaka, the director of the International Energy Agency, has been more realistic; he said that if oil stays over $100 a barrel all along 2011, "we would have the same type of crisis as in 2008"; thus goodbye to global economic growth.

Not only Libya but the whole MENA (Middle East-North Africa) region is scaring the markets to death (certainly not the Persian Gulf autocrats, who have guaranteed multibillion dollar budget surpluses even before the latest spike). If Libya for instance breaks up, major oil fields, controlled by more or less independent tribes, could turn unpredictable.

Libya produces 1.7 million barrels a day over a global total of over 80 million barrels a day (but holds a significant 10% of the European market). The rebels in control of eastern Libya have already cut the gas flow from the al-Wafa field to Italy and the European Union via the Greenstream pipeline since Monday night. Libyan oil terminals are also idle.

Everything would still be rosy as long as the great 2011 Arab revolt does not hit Saudi Arabia. But that's not a given. Every energy producer may crank down production and force prices to rise, but only Saudi Arabia may crank up production to make prices fall. So essentially, before buying their next sports utility vehicle, people should check on King Abdullah's succession.

Back to 1848
Few may remember then-US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice's 2008 northern Africa tour, when she said that US-Libyan relations were entering "a new era of cooperation". Libya left rehab only in 2003, when Gaddafi agreed to abandon his nuclear program and open up to salivating foreign investors in oil and gas; then in 2006 Gaddafi merrily embraced free market and geared up for the usual International Monetary Fund/World Bank "structural adjustment" prescription pills.

Former British prime minister and Iraq war faithful Tony Blair was instrumental in all this, including the facilitation of the sale of tear gas and crowd control weapons which Bahrain's Sunni monarchy and Gaddafi have been unleashing on their own citizens. Wily Gaddafi has managed to become one of the West's favorite pet dictators, and the idyll seemed to be everlasting.

Blame it on that self-immolation in Tunisia. The great 2011 Arab revolt is very much like 1848 - the people's spring that in a few months took Europe by storm and turned the political system of the Congress of Vienna upside down. The problem is the "domino" revolutions of the time, from the Sicily of the Bourbons to the Paris of Louis Philippe, failed. But still - what a pleasure today to reread Karl Marx as a journalist and editor of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, expanding on revolution and counter-revolution. His ultra-sharp analyses still apply.

Would Marx be facebooking and tweeting today he would see Arabs, everywhere, fighting for their dignity and self-expression. He would see how the young protester in Tahrir Square in Cairo, the Shi'ite lawyer in the Pearl roundabout in Bahrain or the anti-Gaddafi teacher fighting for his life in Benghazi have erased the caricature of the bearded terrorist - which now only exists in Gaddafi's imagination (and the nightmares of US neo-conservatives).

No religious fanaticism; no single-minded nationalism. Just like the Europeans in 1848, the Europeans in the 1940s fighting fascism, the Europeans of 1989 getting rid of the Berlin Wall. And Marx would probably predict how those poor conscripts in Libya - just like in Egypt - would rather join their compatriots than smash them with a Tiananmen option.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)









'Brother' Gaddafi, you're going down
(Feb 23, '11)

The mad dog of the Middle East
(Feb 23, '11)




1. Brother Gaddafi, you're going down

2. The mad dog of the Middle East

3. Credibility blown

4. A hard habit to quit

5. The pleasure's all the Dear Leader's

6. Clinton off the mark on Afghanistan

7. India fishing for trouble in Sri Lanka

8. Next stop: The House of Saud

9. Lessons from a whirlwind

10. Bangladesh exports surge

(24 hours to 11:59pm ET, Feb 22, 2011)

miércoles, 23 de febrero de 2011

Why Libya Will Not Be Democratic By Benjamin R. Barber


Author of 'Strong Democracy' and 'Jihad vs. McWorld'
The Huffington Post


I offer my views about Libya here not just as a democratic theorist and HuffPost regular, but as a member of the International Board of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation until this morning, when I resigned. The only two questions worth speculating about in the absence of hard information from Libya about what is happening there today is to think about what might happen tomorrow: What are the possible scenarios if Gadhafi survives the tumult and violence? And what happens if he does not survive? And the one thing I am certain about is that, either way, the outcome is likely to be tragic rather than democratic.

IF HE GOES: If Gadhafi's resistance to the resistance fails, he is likely to die a martyr. No comfortable exile in Caracas for him. Remember, Gadhafi is no Mubarak or Bashar al-Assad, a second or third generation bureaucratic heir to once revolutionary dictatorships. He is a founding revolutionary cut from the same cloth as Nasser and Castro, and his revolutionary rhetoric, if seemingly incoherent and irrelevant to the modern world, is authentic, rooted in the (mostly) vanished world of colonialism, imperialism, socialism and people's democracy.

He is also a clan leader, and in tribal North Africa clans and tribes retain political significance. It was as a member of the Qadaffa clan that Saif Gadhafi pledged allegiance to his father on Sunday night, despite Saif's own genuine history as a reformer and human rights advocate in Libya. Blood trumps principle. While the other supposedly more complacent and pro-regime sons stood by, Saif stood up and martyred his six-year campaign to rescue Libya from autocracy in order to rescue his father from the consequences of autocracy -- embracing his father's struggle to the death. Cynics write Saif off as a hypocrite and reformist poseur, but the truth is quite different, the stuff of an epic tragedy for which the Libyan people are paying a terrible price.

If, then, Gadhafi loses the "revolutionary" struggle to maintain his Libyan Jamahiriya (people's democratic revolution) and his tribal struggle to uphold the "honor" of his clan, the Qadaffa, against rivals like the Zuwayya in the East or the Warfalla in the South, Libya may be in for -- if not the "civil war" and the "rivers of blood" predicted by Saif Gadhafi on Sunday night -- a long period of civil unrest and tribal turmoil. There is no coherent force like a Muslim Brotherhood or a Baathist Party or a professional military to step in either to rule or to pave the way to elections.

The only reform movement was the weak one headed by Saif Gadhafi (!), whose International Foundation for Development and Charity was doing human rights work, and which has now been disbanded (its international governing board on which I served has resigned and its honorable reformist executive director has stepped down in "dismay" over the violence. See my resignation letter at BenjaminBarber.org). But Saif has now aligned himself with his father's regime. If the father is deposed, there is little chance the son can go back to being a reformer and human rights advocate. And Oxford University Press, which contracted to publish the two extraordinary books Saif wrote on civil society and democratic reform in the developing world, will presumably now cancel publication.

The one thing that will not happen in the event of Gadhafi's removal from power is democracy; not now, and not for a long time. Nothing like the conditions that obtained in Cairo obtain in Libya. Rather, continued conflict and chaos and an eventual emergence of a new autocratic regime is likely. Probably not an Islamic regime, since Gadhafi's revolution has been secular and anti-Islamicist, and tribalism is more important than religion in the countryside. In any case, a revolution overthrowing the revolution is not a recipe for democracy. Keep in mind that even in Cairo, the two key members of the Supreme Council supposedly overseeing a transition to democracy are Mubarak's appointees and comrades-in-arms Field Marshall Tantawi and Prime Minister Shafiq.

IF HE SURVIVES: On the other hand, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that Gadhafi will survive, not just because he has access to overwhelming firepower (if he can control those who wield it), but because he has clan and tribal support and at least tacit consent from many Libyans who have depended on him over the years for their own survival. He is a crafty and intelligent survivalist. No autocrat endures for 42 years holding no formal political office because he is a bumbling buffoon totally out of touch (as the media have always treated him and are treating him now). Indeed, the current efforts at the UN to establish a "no fly zone over Libya" can only give credence to his and Saif's argument that the uprising will become an excuse for foreign "imperialist" intervention. It was no accident that Gadhafi stood today in front of his old residence, where his daughter died in the U.S. bombing during the Reagan era, to offer his rambling diatribe against foreigners.

Yet if he does survive, ironically, a genuine reform movement could just possibly be revived. Not by him, but by his son, Saif, who even as he was calling for a battle to the death, was also calling for the immediate convening of a constitutional assembly to debate reform and democracy, for which he had appealed often in the past. Most likely, the loss of credibility that came with Sunday's speech means a comeback as a reformer is unthinkable. Yet though most media people, caught up in the exuberance and horror of events on the ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, dismiss it out of hand, the scenario is not impossible. The survivor turns to his son the reformer and finally empowers him to do what he never let him do when it would have made a difference. Yes, far too little, far too late -- probably. But not altogether out of the question.

And my own guess about whether Gadhafi survives or is deposed? Given what has already transpired on the ground elsewhere in the Middle East, given the brutal and barbaric response to the protesters, and given the widespread revulsion against him outside of Libya, I would say he is likely to go. Chances are three or four to one that his revolution is over. But there is still a slim chance he could survive, and if he does, all those who cast him as nothing more than a monstrous buffoon will have to rethink their easy dismissal and deal with stark reality again. Monstrous maybe, buffoon not. And if he goes, we still we have to take the measure of what might have been, had Saif chosen his country over his clan.

'Brother' Gaddafi, you're going down By Pepe Escobar


You know the fat lady is about to sing when a dictator unleashes hell from above over his own unarmed, civilian compatriots, and bombs parts of his capital city. That's a bridge too far even by the unspeakable standards of Western-backed dictators in the Arab world.

You know the (ghastly) show may be over when Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, one of the most popular Sunni authorities in the world, not least because of his weekly show on al-Jazeera, issues a fatwa - "I am issuing a fatwa now to kill [Muammar] Gaddafi. To any soldier, to any man who can pull the trigger and kill this man to do so" - and then prays live, on al-Jazeera, for the end of the



Libyan dictator ("O Lord save the Libyans from this pharaoh." When he finishes, the al-Jazeera anchor says "Amen").

You know the bells are ringing when your "Abu Omar Brigade", responsible for your protection, is still on a rampage; but your ambassadors around the world defect en masse; your own deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Omar al-Dabashi, says your government is carrying out genocide; your fighter pilots refuse to bomb your cities; your military officers, in a statement, ask all members of the army to head to Tripoli and depose you; a coalition of Islamic leaders tells all Muslims it is their duty to rebel against you because of your "bloody crimes against humanity"; and to top it off, people are calling for a "million man march" following the Egyptian model.

And what about the Maltese Falcons? In a day of volcanic activity, it's hard to beat the spectacular defection of two colonels of the Libyan Air Force, who flew their Mirages to Malta. They had refused to bomb protesters in Benghazi, telling Maltese authorities they had come so close to carrying out their mission that they could see the crowds on the ground. They also passed "classified" information about what the Libyan military has been up to.

And all this in just one day - Monday.

It was not enough to deploy "black African" mercenaries in a shoot-to-kill rampage in Benghazi. Already on Sunday, Sheikh Faraj al-Zuway, leader of the crucial al-Zuwayya tribe in eastern Libya, had threatened to cut oil exports to the West within 24 hours unless what he called the "oppression of protesters" in Benghazi was stopped.

Akram Al-Warfalli, a leader of the al-Warfalla tribe, one of Libya's biggest, in the south of Tripoli, had told al-Jazeera Gaddafi is "no longer a brother, we tell you to leave the country". The 500,000-strong Berber, Tuaregs from the southern desert, are also against him. When you have four of your key tribes - the spine of your system - marching on Tripoli to get rid of you, you better watch out.

History may eventually register how Gaddafi's appalling 41-year rule in Libya (he was already in power when "Tricky Dicky" Richard Nixon was the United States president) virtually collapsed in only 24 hours. There will be blood - a lot of blood; but "brother" is about to go down.

'Rivers of blood will run through Libya'
The beginning of the end was classic Arab dictator stuff; Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, looking like an upscale bouncer in suit and tie, went on Libyan state TV on Sunday night instead of his father to deliver a threatening/repellent/pathetic speech that only infuriated the Libyan masses even more, after six days of protests in the historic Cyrenaica region.

After threatening to "eradicate the pockets of sedition" (echoes of Iran's leadership eradicating protests last week) Gaddafi's "modernizing" son said Libyans risked igniting a civil war in which Libya's oil wealth "will be burned".

In 2009, Said received a PhD from the London School of Economics (LSE) with a thesis titled "The Role of Civil Society in the Democratization of Global Governance Institutions: From 'Soft Power' to Collective Decision-Making". Last year he delivered a lecture about it at the LSE (listen to it here.)

Isn't wonderful that the ghastliest dictators in the world may send their offspring to the best schools in the world where they can appease the West's false consciousness while back at home they openly threaten their own people and go for sniper fire, automatic weapons and heavy artillery against their unarmed compatriots?

It's doubtful the LSE taught Saif how to ignite a flash civil war with just a rant. But that's what he accomplished.

Libyan writer Faouzi Abdelhamid - comparing the name Saif al-Islam ("sword of Islam") with Saif al-I'dam ("sword of execution") came out all guns blazing, calling the whole Gaddafi clan criminals and thieves; "You don't even have the right of living among us as ordinary citizens, because you're guilty of high treason".

By the time Saif was delivering his threats, the eastern city of Benghazi had already fallen to the protesters. Tripoli was next, on Monday. With the regime blocking all phone lines, all day Monday occasional, frantic tweets relayed all sorts of terrifying rumors and facts - inevitably clouded by the ominous sound of live ammunition. Helicopters raining bullets down on people in the streets below. Fighter jets launching strikes. Snipers firing from building tops.

Schools, government offices and most stores in Tripoli were closed, with armed "Revolutionary Committees", ie regime thugs, patrolling the streets hunting for protesters in Tripoli's old city. According to Salem Gnan, a London-based spokesman for the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, 80 people may have died when protesters surrounded Gaddafi's residence and were shot at from inside the compound.

As the People's Hall - where the parliament meets when it is in session in Tripoli - was set on fire and all cities south of Tripoli were progressively being "liberated", al-Jazeera managed to trace the source of jamming of its Arabsat satellite frequency to a Libyan intelligence building south of the capital.

Ahmed Elgazir, a human-rights researcher with the Libyan News Center (LNC) in Geneva, later told al-Jazeera he got a call for help from a woman witnessing a massacre in progress on a satellite phone. Eyewitnesses reported to Agence France-Presse another "massacre" in the Fashloum and Tajoura districts of Tripoli. By late Monday night, the (unconfirmed) death toll in Tripoli alone had reached at least 250.

Among Libyans, virtually all information all around the country was and remains word of mouth. But tweets that reached al-Jazeera or the BBC also emphasized a profound disgust with the deafening silence of the "international community" ("Are we only worth mentioning when it has to do with oil and terrorism?")

Round up the oily condemnations
Said "international community" indeed started noticing when the Libyan Quryna newspaper reported protests had broken out in the northern city of Ras Lanuf, whose oil refinery processes 220,000 barrels a day.

Yes, apart from Gaddafi's antics, Libya registers in the West because it exports 1.7 million barrels of oil a day. Its gross domestic product is US$77 billion - number 62 in world rankings; that theoretically implies a per capita income of over $12,000 a year, more, for instance, than BRIC member Brazil. But profound inequality is the norm; roughly 35% of Libyans live below the poverty line, and unemployment is running at an unbearable 30%. The oil wealth stays in Tripolitania. Eastern Libya - Cyrenaica - where the anti-Gaddafi revolution started, is dirt poor.

In the high-stakes front, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) - also owner of a London-based hedge fund - has invested more than $70 billion around the world. It's a major shareholder, for instance, in the Financial Times, Fiat and one of Italy's top soccer clubs, Juventus. LIA invests - and plans to invest - billions in Britain.

Cue to the European Union (EU) foreign ministers issuing the usual, bland, bureaucratic condemnation. At least Italian Prime Minister, "bunga bunga" idol and close Gaddafi pal Silvio Berlusconi, who had said earlier he didn't want to "disturb" his friend, had to qualify the massacre of civilians as "unacceptable" and profess he was "alarmed". To see Berlusconi literally kissing Gaddafi's hands, go here No less than 32% of Libya's oil exports go to Italy.

Then there's another classic - Washington's deafening silence. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued the standard bland condemnation. Libyan-American scientist and activist Naeem Gheriany told the Institute for Public Accuracy the Barack Obama administration "says it's 'concerned' about the situation - there's no real condemnation in spite of the dire situation. People are being massacred in the hundreds, Gaddafi is reportedly using anti-aircraft guns to shoot people. In a few days, more people in Libya have apparently been killed than in weeks in Iran, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen and even Egypt (which has a much larger population) ... Even the oil cannot justify this silence."

Not to mention that Washington and Gaddafi have been the best "war on terror" pals. Captured al-Qaeda operative Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi - the object of a Central Intelligence Agency "rendition" to former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Omar "Sheikh al-Torture" Suleiman, who duly tortured him into confessing to a non-existent Saddam-al-Qaeda weapons of mass destruction connection that then-secretary of state Colin Powell used as "intelligence" at his United Nations speech in February 2003 - was later tracked in Libya by Human Rights Watch just to end up his life as an alleged "suicide".

Milan villa or The Hague?
Libyan opposition writer Ashour Shamis has remarked, "For Gaddafi it's kill or be killed". The family told Saudi paper al-Sharq al-Awsat, "We will all die on Libyan soil." That means Gaddafi and a row of hated offspring.

Son Khamis - the commander of an elite special forces unit, trained in Russia - is the mastermind of the repression in Benghazi. Son Saadi is, or was there too, alongside the head of military intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi.

Son Muatassim is Gaddafi's national security adviser and, until now, possible successor. In 2009, he tried to set up his own special forces unit to erode Khamis's power.

Son Saif, the "modernizer" with an LSE diploma, cuts no mustard with the regime's old guard and the dreaded "Revolutionary Committees".

Son Saadi is basically a thug fond of raising hell across nightclubs in Europe. Same applies to son Hannibal.

It all looks and sounds like a cheap blood-splattered gangster movie. What to make of Gaddafi's bizarre 20-second appearance on state TV early this Tuesday ("I'm in Tripoli, not in Venezuela"), clutching an umbrella, sitting inside a cream-colored microvan and sporting a winter hat with ear flaps, with no clue of what is going on? (After all he was supporting his pals, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and to Mubarak, until the very end). He defined TV channels - such as al-Jazeera - as "dogs" (in the 1980s he had already used hit squads to murder exiled "stray dogs" who challenged his revolution).

Still, Gaddafi should not be underestimated. He controls all the hardware - defense, security, foreign affairs. Plus all those "black African" mercenaries/exterminators paid in gold. Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh said Yemen was not Egypt or Tunisia. Gaddafi said Libya was not Egypt or Tunisia. Mubarak said Egypt was not Tunisia.

They were all wrong; the entire Arab world now is Tunisia. The Libyan masses hate "their" leader. Even fellow Arab dictators - with the exception of the House of Saud - hate him. He has few expat options. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez would be crazy to offer him asylum and forever destroy his "champion of the poor" credibility.

Well, there's always Berlusconi. Nice villa near Milan, great pasta, and he can pitch his Bedouin tent in the luxurious gardens. And if Berlusconi is sent to jail in his "Rubygate"-related trial in April, Gaddafi may even move up to the main residence. But, after you bombed your own citizens from the air, and hired mercenaries to shoot them, there is only one choice destination: the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.



(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

23-F: El golpe que vacunó la democracia española


POR JUANMA ROMERO
Diari0 Público- Madrid
Políticos y expertos coinciden en que el derribo de la intentona militar puso fin al persistente ruido de sables. Contribuyó a un primer recorte autonómico que luego acabó diluyéndose.

Pasan las 12 del mediodía. Los diputados van desalojando el hemiciclo, de forma ordenada. Fuera se abrazan, responden a los periodistas, algunos se acercan al general Alfonso Armada para darle las gracias. Él les replica con un gesto desencajado, tenso. El propio Adolfo Suárez le dispensa un efusivo saludo. Mientras, una cámara ha grabado la salida a hurtadillas de algunos guardias civiles por una ventana a la altura de la calle. Van entregándose. También lo hará el teniente coronel Antonio Tejero.

Esa mañana, la del martes 24 de febrero de 1981, acaba la pesadilla. El secuestro, durante 17 horas y media, de 350 diputados, del Gobierno, de periodistas, de ujieres y personal del Congreso. Fracasa el golpe de Estado del 23-F.

¿Y después, qué?

El fin de la asonada militar no dejó las cosas como estaban. Tuvo consecuencias, a corto y medio plazo. Positivas y negativas. La consolidación de la democracia, la aceleración de la desintegración del partido gobernante, la Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), la ampliación de la victoria electoral del PSOE en 1982, la puesta en marcha de la modernización del Ejército, el intento (fallido) de recorte del Estado autonómico, la reestructuración de la derecha, el refuerzo de la legitimidad de la Monarquía. Efectos colaterales en los que, en mayor o menor medida, políticos, historiadores, politólogos y sociólogos coinciden hoy. Justo 30 años después.

El TC frenó el intento de UCD y PSOE de centralizar competencias

“El 23-F actuó de vacuna contra el golpismo anterior. Es el punto final de la intervención de los militares en la política española. Resolvió uno de los grandes problemas de este país y sirvió para asentar la democracia”. Xusto Beramendi, catedrático de Historia Contemporánea de la Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, emplea un término que calcan otros expertos: “Vacuna”. El punto de no retorno. La dosis que liquidó el ruido de sables –posteriormente hubo algún intento aislado que se logró desactivar, como el previsto antes de las generales de 1982–. “Sí, fue una vacuna”, afirma también Andoni Monforte, diputado del PNV en el hemiciclo aquel 23-F. “Tras aquella gigante manifestación del 27 de febrero, cuando España se echó a la calle a defender la democracia, se vio que ya no era posible una vuelta atrás”.

“El peligro de un nuevo golpe queda conjurado. Y cuando en sólo un año se pudo procesar a 33 implicados en el juicio de Campamento, en consejo de guerra, se percibió que la democracia se atrevía con todo”, esgrime Juan Francisco Fuentes Aragonés, autor de Adolfo Suárez. Biografía política (Planeta), presentado esta semana. Este catedrático de Historia Contemporánea de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) cita otro elemento conectado: la puesta al día de las Fuerzas Armadas, impulsada por Felipe González y su primer ministro de Defensa, Narcís Serra, “ayudada por el relevo generacional en los ejércitos y el ingreso en la OTAN en 1982”.

Hacia el ‘café para todos’
Pronto asoma otra palabra: LOAPA. El proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, que UCD y PSOE sacaron adelante en julio de 1982.

Era la tijera a la descentralización de competencias, frente a la que los nacionalistas interpusieron un recurso previo ante el Tribunal Constitucional. Y lo ganaron. En 1983 se anularon 14 de los 38 artículos. “Esa fue la peor consecuencia del golpe, una concesión lamentable para contentar a los militares, que tanto hablaban de la ruptura de la unidad de España”, comenta Carles Gasòliba, diputado de CiU en aquella I Legislatura (1979-1982). Daniel Fernández, hoy coordinador de los parlamentarios del PSC y portavoz adjunto del Grupo Socialista en el Congreso, también cree que el 23-F “sí influyó” en la aprobación de la ley, “pero todo quedó en nada” tras el fallo del TC, de forma que “no ralentizó en absoluto la construcción del Estado autonómico”.

Entre los analistas, la polémica no suscita consenso. Como recuerda Pere Ysàs, catedrático de Historia Contemporánea de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, el 23-F “ilumina más los años anteriores que los posteriores”. Y la LOAPA, la convicción de UCD de que “había que regular el proceso autonómico”, era previa a la rebelión, y de hecho ya había mantenido conversaciones con el PSOE.

La desarticulación del 23-F impulsó la victoria socialista del año siguiente“Se sentía que había que dar forma a un sistema que aún no estaba claro. Se contaba con Catalunya, País Vasco y Galicia, pero el problemón para UCD fue Andalucía, que votó acceder a su autonomía por la vía rápida, la del artículo 151 de la Constitución. Yo no veo pues relación directa con la ley”, asegura José Carlos Rueda Laffond, historiador de la UCM. “Más que paralización, se produjo una generalización del Estado de las CCAA, una nivelación de competencias, el café para todos”, tercia Abdón Mateos, catedrático de la UNED y líder de la Asociación de Historiadores del Presente.

Fernando Vallespín, politólogo de la Autónoma de Madrid y expresidente del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), estima que el 23-F ayudó a vencer temores y a “agilizar” la España autonómica. Manuel Redero, profesor de Historia Contemporánea de la Universidad de Salamanca, lo suscribe. Se apoya en la situación en la zona republicana en 1936 para ilustrar que, si un golpe fracasa, genera “un proceso contrario al que los rebeldes pretendían”.

Pero el golpe no fracasó, o no del todo, según Mario Zubiaga. “Fue un aviso, definió unos límites del sistema que no podían traspasarse. Hasta la primera legislatura de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, en que se revisita el pacto de la Transición y se abren temas que se entendían cerrados, como la memoria histórica o la España plurinacional, se mantuvo ese acuerdo”, rubrica este profesor de Ciencia Política de la Universidad del País Vasco.

Agrega que la solución Armada, ese Gobierno de concentración presidido por un militar que defendió el general amigo del rey el 23-F, no murió: “Condicionó las políticas posteriores. Y se expresó en los pactos autonómicos de UCD-PSOE y luego de PSOE-PP. El golpe no es más que la manifestación más radical de una voz que sigue hoy presente”.

La astracanada militar pudo no tener influjo en la desaparición, desde 1982 hasta hoy, de los grupos de socialistas catalanes y vascos en el Congreso, según los expertos. El parlamentario Daniel Fernández lo atribuye a que la victoria de González exigió “un solo grupo y una total coordinación”. Sólo Beramendi y Fermín Bouza, sociólogo de la UCM, achacan ese cambio al “triunfo del alma jacobina” del PSOE.

La agonía del “desencanto”
“Cuando entró Tejero al Congreso y comenzaron los disparos y ráfagas de metralleta, sabía que tenía el deber de no tirarme al suelo, por dignidad, por respeto al PCE, que había luchado heroicamente contra el franquismo. Lo decidí en milésimas de segundo”. Santiago Carrillo aún reviste de aplomo aquellas horas críticas: “Cuando me sacaron del hemiciclo, tuve tiempo de sobra para repasar mi vida y pensar en qué momento me matarían”.

El socialista Manuel Núñez Encabo, el último diputado que pudo votar en aquella segunda sesión de investidura de Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, recuerda la imagen “fantasmagórica” del asalto del teniente coronel. “Sentíamos el peligro de muerte, que éramos rehenes. Las balas pasaban sobre nuestras cabezas, ellos hablaban con sus fusiles. No teníamos más información que la radio de Fernando Abril Martorell”. Gasòliba rememora ese “miedo” atenazador, la “vergüenza” por la imagen de España al mundo.

Miedo había fuera también. “Todo el mundo anduvo con tiento. Pero si los ciudadanos no se echaron a la calle esa noche fue porque entendían que era el momento de los partidos, en los que aún confiaban mucho”, razona Bouza. Lo que parece claro es que tras la sedición “desapareció el desencanto”, “se recompuso el consenso” y se destensó el ambiente, admiten Fuentes y Redero.

Las víctimas del franquismo creen que ellos sí pagaron las consecuencias Pero el miedo, para Carrillo, duró más. El 23-F se guareció tras las urnas, explica, como una sombra amenazante: “La gente tuvo miedo a que el PCE tuviese muchos diputados y el Ejército volviese a las andadas”. A ello atribuye el batacazo de su partido en 1982 (cuatro escaños frente a los 23 de 1979) y el arrollador triunfo del PSOE (202 actas).

No es la razón de los expertos, que culpan del resbalón del PCE a su crisis interna. “El 23-F condensó procesos que ya estaban en marcha antes”, avanza Ysàs. Y uno era el ascenso del PSOE, inversamente proporcional a la implosión de UCD. Vallespín juzga que sin la intentona “no habría sido posible esa mayoría tan holgada de los socialistas”. “Se despejó el temor a otro golpe y los españoles optaron por la democracia plena, la alternancia, por los que no estaban contaminados por el franquismo”.

La afirmación, muy compartida, es rebatida por Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, sociólogo de la UCM: “Contribuyó más la dimisión de Suárez y la descomposición de UCD. Lo lógico no es pensar que tras un pronunciamiento la gente vota a la izquierda”. Los cambios también se trasladaron a la otra banda, incide Mateos. La caída de UCD y la “desactivación de la extrema derecha” provocaron, luego, la refundación de Alianza Popular.

¿Influyó el recuerdo del 23-F en la gestión de González? “Cambian las prioridades. Felipe debe abandonar sus proyectos más ideológicos en aras de la modernización del Ejército y del Estado”, apunta Mateos, quien también sugiere que la “contrapartida” a los militares, por el terrible acoso de ETA en aquellos años de plomo, pudo ser “la guerra sucia y agresiva”: los GAL.

Redero liga esa “moderación, a veces excesiva” del PSOE, al hecho de llegar al poder. “Hay que ver toda la secuencia histórica, la redefinición ideológica que sigue el partido desde el congreso de Suresnes [1974]”, señala Rueda Laffond. Fuentes subraya que la política socioeconómica “traía sin cuidado” a los golpistas, así que el “primer sesgo liberal de Felipe se debe al fracaso de la experiencia de nacionalizaciones del presidente François Mitterand en Francia". Una afirmación que suscribe Fernández, del PSC.



La imagen del Ejército
Encabo reconoce ese cambio de piel de su partido: "Felipe debía proseguir con el programa de la Transición y no podía gobernar absolutamente. El 23-F no alteró los contenidos, sino el cómo. Y se entraba en una nueva fase. Se suavizó el tema autonómico, se emprendieron las reformas, se fue con cuidado en la modernización del Ejército. El PSOE perdió algunas de sus señas de identidad, como la memoria histórica, pero no por el golpe”.

El pasado. Emilio Silva, presidente de la Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica, defiende que el 23-F “conquistó la impunidad social”, tras consagrar la "impunidad jurídica y política". “De forma aislada, algunas familias en La Rioja o Aranjuez [Madrid] abrieron sus fosas. Pero el golpe hizo que se reviviera el terror de la dictadura y se parase el movimiento”.

Gervasio Puerta, que cumplirá 90 años este 2011, tiene aún fresco el temor de esa noche. “Supuso un retraso serio en el reconocimiento de las libertades y el rescate de la memoria”. Puerta, líder de la Asociación de Ex Presos y Represaliados Políticos desde 1989, admite cómo sus primeras reivindicaciones eran económicas.

Casa con el criterio de Paloma Aguilar, profesora de la Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) y autora de Políticas de la memoria y memorias de la política (Alianza, 2008): “Podía haber grupúsculos, pero primero la batalla estaba en la equiparación de derechos porque había mayores sin pensión. La petición de reparación simbólica llegaría después, en 2000”. El resto de expertos admite, a lo sumo, que la sublevación “pudo poner en el congelador” el tema. Primaba el sostenimiento de la “política del olvido”, el pacto de silencio de la Transición.

Han transcurrido 30 años. El Ejército mudó su cara –el CIS ratificó en noviembre que es la institución más valorada, con un 5,71 de nota– y el propio golpe vuelve a los libros, la TV y el cine. Rueda Laffond, coautor junto a Carlota Coronado de La mirada televisiva. Ficción y representación histórica en España (Fragua, 2009), alude al refuerzo del “mito del 23-F”, a cómo la ficción cuela “elementos de proximidad y emotividad” en un suceso que aún despierta morbo y que acentúa, “de forma descontextualizada, el protagonismo del rey”.

Y mientras, retornan las leyendas, la insistencia en que hay lagunas cuando, según coinciden todos los analistas, “se conoce ya lo esencial de la trama”. “Se sabe todo. Quizá la única duda es el verdadero papel de Armada –desliza Fuentes–. Pero que queden cabos sueltos da verosimilitud a la historia oficial del 23-F. Sólo los conspiradores o las novelas policiacas se preocupan de anudarlos”.

La revolución árabe y la izquierda latinoamericana


JOAQUÍN VILLALOBOS. El País

En los últimos 50 años, buena parte de la izquierda latinoamericana definió su identidad bajo el paradigma de la revolución social que estableció el modelo cubano, con salud y educación como sus grandes ejes de transformación. La democracia no fue considerada revolucionaria, sino "burguesa". Las derechas y sus dictaduras tampoco tuvieron como paradigma a la democracia, sino a la modernidad mediante el desarrollo económico. Ambas corrientes consideraron que si atendían las necesidades sociales o el progreso económico, las libertades democráticas no tenían importancia. Había en Latinoamérica solo un autoritarismo de izquierda en Cuba, el resto eran dictaduras de derecha. En la primera preferían expulsar a los opositores y en las segundas asesinarlos. El resultado, en ambos casos, fue pobreza sin libertades e inestabilidad durante décadas, con sociedades en conflicto permanente.

La noticia en otros webs

webs en español
en otros idiomas
Resolver la exclusión social a costa de la exclusión política conduce a conflictos permanentes

Estados Unidos despreció igualmente a la democracia para Latinoamérica, la "alianza para el progreso" puso énfasis en el desarrollo económico y no en las libertades. Con el anticomunismo como política, realizó intervenciones, aisló a Cuba y respaldó dictadores, golpes de Estado, fraudes electorales y matanzas. Esta situación comenzó a cambiar con la política de derechos humanos del Gobierno de James Carter, que fue determinante en la caída del dictador Anastasio Somoza de Nicaragua en 1979. La posición de Carter fue visionaria en plantear los derechos humanos y la inclusión de la izquierda. Sin embargo, la reacción conservadora estadounidense trajo con la administración Reagan el conflicto más cruento que haya vivido el continente. Así, en Centroamérica, durante los 80, cientos de miles murieron en una guerra que, teniendo raíces propias, se interpretó como un apéndice de la guerra fría.

Luego de múltiples luchas populares, los derechos humanos y la democracia comenzaron a convertirse en los valores hegemónicos de la política y en los factores de legitimación de los gobiernos. La izquierda llegó al poder y comenzó la alternancia. La transición comenzó hace aproximadamente 30 años a partir de cambios democráticos ocurridos en diferentes países. Este proceso a pesar de sus imperfecciones, ha permitido que el continente esté viviendo un prolongado período de estabilidad política que apunta a consolidarse.

La caída del muro de Berlín, con la reacción en cadena que produjo en toda Europa del Este, fue una revolución anunciada. Lo que está ocurriendo en el mundo árabe no lo predijo nadie. Antes de Túnez y Egipto dominaba la idea de que la democracia era un valor occidental, culturalmente incompatible con la cultura árabe. Sin embargo, la movilización revolucionaria en los países árabes demuestra que el desarrollo de clases educadas, comunicadas e informadas es incompatible con el autoritarismo. Este logra espacio en sociedades con gran retraso político, económico y social. Detrás de cada crisis terminal de un régimen autoritario hay un conflicto de representación y participación en el poder de nuevos grupos sociales. La democracia está demostrando ser un valor cada vez más universal en la medida que el progreso económico transforma la estructura de clases de los países.

En el momento en que los ciudadanos alcanzan un mayor nivel de educación, la crítica, el disenso y la diversidad de pensamiento se multiplican inevitablemente. Es imposible que todo mundo piense de la misma manera y las formas de pensar de las personas tienden a modificarse con el tiempo y con los cambios de condiciones. No pueden todos ser de derecha o de izquierda, creer en Dios o tener el mismo Dios, eso es absurdo. Cuando el número de ciudadanos con conciencia crítica aumenta sustancialmente se debilita la posibilidad de gobernar a partir de la superstición, la religión, el caudillismo, las dinastías familiares y las verdades únicas del dogmatismo político. La vieja alianza Iglesia, militares y terratenientes, que sostuvo la mayoría de dictaduras del continente, se acabó con el crecimiento de las clases medias y el surgimiento de nuevos grupos de poder económico.

La democracia y los derechos humanos no son solo un asunto ético o ideológico, son una tecnología de gobierno que permite mantener cohesionada a la sociedad en medio de las diferencias y la natural diversidad que la compone. Esto es posible cuando hay clases sociales más educadas que entienden que la tolerancia entre contrarios es fundamental para la convivencia pacifica. Pero lo más importante es que ninguna sociedad polarizada en extremo y con divisiones profundas entre sus habitantes es viable ni tiene posibilidades de desarrollo. Por ello, la exclusión social que deriva en exclusión política es un asunto vital de resolver. América Latina no era viable sin la inclusión de las izquierdas, así como el mundo árabe no lo será sin la tolerancia hacia los islamistas hasta lograr su moderación.

Cuando la sociedad se mantiene cohesionada puede utilizar todas sus capacidades y esto da lugar a una relación directa entre democracia y desarrollo. El empobrecimiento social, moral, intelectual, institucional y económico de Cuba tras 50 años de revolución, contrasta con el desarrollo social, educativo, económico e institucional de Costa Rica, Chile y Uruguay; los tres países con mayor vigencia y cultura democrática del continente. Algo igual ocurrió entre el fracaso de la Europa Oriental dominada por los comunistas y el exitoso desarrollo de la Europa Occidental bajo la influencia de la izquierda socialdemócrata. La actual situación de gran violencia, profunda crisis social, extrema pobreza y riesgo de ser estados fallidos de Haití, Guatemala, El Salvador y Honduras son el resultado de haber vivido las dictaduras más represivas y prolongadas del continente. Los riesgos autoritarios y la extrema polarización que viven Bolivia, Venezuela y Ecuador han resultado de haber excluido social y políticamente a una parte considerable de su población.

Después de medio siglo de revolución cubana, la democracia ha demostrado ser más revolucionaria, más capaz de resolver la pobreza y más eficaz en lograr la participación ciudadana a través del voto y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil. En democracia si divides a tu país perderás. Resolver la exclusión social a costa de la exclusión política conduce a conflictos permanentes y a la pérdida de capacidades vitales para el desarrollo. Cuba ha perdido miles de científicos, escritores, artistas y emprendedores, una gran parte de ellos de izquierda y eso mismo está ocurriendo en Venezuela. La sangría intelectual cubana ha sido tal, que no se puede separar el exitoso desarrollo de Florida del exilio cubano.

Es imposible que un pensamiento único derive en progreso. La clave del desarrollo está en la interacción dialéctica entre diversidad, diferencias, pesos, contrapesos, alternancias, aciertos y errores. Las libertades, las leyes y las instituciones son más importantes para los pobres que el paternalismo autoritario. No querer dejar los gobiernos, envejecer en el poder y heredarle a parientes el gobierno no es revolucionario. La izquierda latinoamericana necesita abandonar el mito cubano para asumir de una vez por todas a la democracia como su identidad. La dictadura cubana y las pretensiones autoritarias de Chávez son los últimos obstáculos a la madurez política del continente y a la continuación delavance de la misma izquierda. No hay régimen autoritario eterno, Castro y Chávez no permanecerán, como no permanecieron las dictaduras centroamericanas, las sudamericanas y ahora las árabes, no importa si son religiosas o liberales, de izquierda o de derecha, los pueblos siempre terminan hartos y las derrumban.

Joaquín Villalobos fue guerrillero salvadoreño y es consultor para la resolución de conflictos internacionales.

martes, 22 de febrero de 2011

Revolution and the Muslim World By George Friedman


The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink.

There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire. These moments do not come often. Those that come to mind include 1848, where a rising in France engulfed Europe. There was also 1968, where the demonstrations of what we might call the New Left swept the world: Mexico City, Paris, New York and hundreds of other towns saw anti-war revolutions staged by Marxists and other radicals. Prague saw the Soviets smash a New Leftist government. Even China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could, by a stretch, be included. In 1989, a wave of unrest, triggered by East Germans wanting to get to the West, generated an uprising in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule.

Each had a basic theme. The 1848 uprisings attempted to establish liberal democracies in nations that had been submerged in the reaction to Napoleon. 1968 was about radical reform in capitalist society. 1989 was about the overthrow of communism. They were all more complex than that, varying from country to country. But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.

Some of these revolutions had great impact. 1989 changed the global balance of power. 1848 ended in failure at the time — France reverted to a monarchy within four years — but set the stage for later political changes. 1968 produced little that was lasting. The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.

The Current Rising in Context

In looking at the current rising, the geographic area is clear: The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises. Of course, many other Muslim countries also had revolutionary events that have not, at least until now, escalated into events that threaten regimes or even ruling personalities. There have been hints of such events elsewhere. There were small demonstrations in China, and of course Wisconsin is in turmoil over budget cuts. But these don’t really connect to what is happening in the Middle East. The first was small and the second is not taking inspiration from Cairo. So what we have is a rising in the Arab world that has not spread beyond there for the time being.

The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted. This has expressed itself in different ways. In Bahrain, for example, the rising was of the primarily Shiite population against a predominantly Sunni royal family. In Egypt, it was against the person of Hosni Mubarak. In Libya, it is against the regime and person of Moammar Gadhafi and his family, and is driven by tribal hostility.

Why has it come together now? One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War. Since the early 1970s, the region has, with the exception of Iran in 1979, been fairly stable in the sense that the regimes — and even the personalities who rose up in the unstable phase — stabilized their countries and imposed regimes that could not easily be moved. Gadhafi, for example, overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and has governed continually for 42 years since then.

Any regime dominated by a small group of people over time will see that group use their position to enrich themselves. There are few who can resist for 40 years. It is important to recognize that Gadhafi, for example, was once a genuine, pro-Soviet revolutionary. But over time, revolutionary zeal declines and avarice emerges along with the arrogance of extended power. And in the areas of the region where there had not been regime changes since after World War I, this principle stays true as well, although interestingly, over time, the regimes seem to learn to spread the wealth a bit.

Thus, what emerged throughout the region were regimes and individuals who were classic kleptocrats. More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time. And we can add to this that they are people who were planning to maintain family power and money by installing sons as their political heirs. The same process, with variations, is under way in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a rising against the revolutionaries of previous generations.

The revolutions have been coming for a long time. The rising in Tunisia, particularly when it proved successful, caused it to spread. As in 1848, 1968 and 1989, similar social and cultural conditions generate similar events and are triggered by the example of one country and then spread more broadly. That has happened in 2011 and is continuing.

A Uniquely Sensitive Region

It is, however, happening in a region that is uniquely sensitive at the moment. The U.S.-jihadist war means that, as with previous revolutionary waves, there are broader potential geopolitical implications. 1989 meant the end of the Soviet empire, for example. In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them. We do not see these revolutions as a vast conspiracy by radical Islamists to take control of the region. A conspiracy that vast is easily detected, and the security forces of the individual countries would have destroyed the conspiracies quickly. No one organized the previous waves, although there have been conspiracy theories about them as well. They arose from certain conditions, following the example of one incident. But particular groups certainly tried, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of them.

In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them. Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious. They are a broad, transnational and disparate group brought up in conspiratorial methods. This is their opportunity to create a broad international coalition. Thus, as with traditional communists and the New Left in the 1960s, they did not create the rising but they would be fools not to try to take advantage of it. I would add that there is little question but that the United States and other Western countries are trying to influence the direction of the uprisings. For both sides, this is a difficult game to play, but it is particularly difficult for the United States as outsiders to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.

But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.

Democratic revolutions have two phases. The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments. The example of Hitler is useful as a caution on what kind of governments a young democracy can produce, since he came to power through democratic and constitutional means — and then abolished democracy to cheering crowds. So there are three crosscurrents here. The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.

In any event, the real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes. Let’s consider the process of revolution for the moment, beginning by distinguishing a demonstration from an uprising. A demonstration is merely the massing of people making speeches. This can unsettle the regime and set the stage for more serious events, but by itself, it is not significant. Unless the demonstrations are large enough to paralyze a city, they are symbolic events. There have been many demonstrations in the Muslim world that have led nowhere; consider Iran.

It is interesting here to note that the young frequently dominate revolutions like 1848, 1969 and 1989 at first. This is normal. Adults with families and maturity rarely go out on the streets to face guns and tanks. It takes young people to have the courage or lack of judgment to risk their lives in what might be a hopeless cause. However, to succeed, it is vital that at some point other classes of society join them. In Iran, one of the key moments of the 1979 revolution was when the shopkeepers joined young people in the street. A revolution only of the young, as we saw in 1968 for example, rarely succeeds. A revolution requires a broader base than that, and it must go beyond demonstrations. The moment it goes beyond the demonstration is when it confronts troops and police. If the demonstrators disperse, there is no revolution. If they confront the troops and police, and if they carry on even after they are fired on, then you are in a revolutionary phase. Thus, pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.

A Revolution’s Key Event

This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event. In Bahrain, the troops fired on demonstrators and killed some. The demonstrators dispersed and then were allowed to demonstrate — with memories of the gunfire fresh. This was a revolution contained. In Egypt, the military and police opposed each other and the military sided with the demonstrators, for complex reasons obviously. Personnel change, if not regime change, was inevitable. In Libya, the military has split wide open.

When that happens, you have reached a branch in the road. If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war. Indeed, one way for a revolution to succeed is to proceed to civil war, turning the demonstrators into an army, so to speak. That’s what Mao did in China. Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success. Always, the point to look for is thus the police joining with the demonstrators. This happened widely in 1989 but hardly at all in 1968. It happened occasionally in 1848, but the balance was always on the side of the state. Hence, that revolution failed.

It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution. Therefore, to return to the earlier theme, the most important question on the role of radical Islamists is not their presence in the crowd, but their penetration of the military and police. If there were a conspiracy, it would focus on joining the military, waiting for demonstrations and then striking.

Those who argue that these risings have nothing to do with radical Islam may be correct in the sense that the demonstrators in the streets may well be students enamored with democracy. But they miss the point that the students, by themselves, can’t win. They can only win if the regime wants them to, as in Egypt, or if other classes and at least some of the police or military — people armed with guns who know how to use them — join them. Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.

The problem with revolutions is that the people who start them rarely finish them. The idealist democrats around Alexander Kerensky in Russia were not the ones who finished the revolution. The thuggish Bolsheviks did. In these Muslim countries, the focus on the young demonstrators misses the point just as it did in Tiananmen Square. It wasn’t the demonstrators that mattered, but the soldiers. If they carried out orders, there would be no revolution.

I don’t know the degree of Islamist penetration of the military in Libya, to pick one example of the unrest. I suspect that tribalism is far more important than theology. In Egypt, I suspect the regime has saved itself by buying time. Bahrain was more about Iranian influence on the Shiite population than Sunni jihadists at work. But just as the Iranians are trying to latch on to the process, so will the Sunni jihadists.

The Danger of Chaos

I suspect some regimes will fall, mostly reducing the country in question to chaos. The problem, as we are seeing in Tunisia, is that frequently there is no one on the revolutionaries’ side equipped to take power. The Bolsheviks had an organized party. In these revolutions, the parties are trying to organize themselves during the revolution, which is another way to say that the revolutionaries are in no position to govern. The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.

All of this is speculation. What we do know is that this is not the first wave of revolution in the world, and most waves fail, with their effects seen decades later in new regimes and political cultures. Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.

In the meantime, as you watch the region, remember not to watch the demonstrators. Watch the men with the guns. If they stand their ground for the state, the demonstrators have failed. If some come over, there is some chance of victory. And if victory comes, and democracy is declared, do not assume that what follows will in any way please the West — democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.

The situation remains fluid, and there are no broad certainties. It is a country-by-country matter now, with most regimes managing to stay in power to this point. There are three possibilities. One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades. The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance. The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.

If I were to guess at this point, I would guess that we are facing 1848. The Muslim world will not experience massive regime change as in 1989, but neither will the effects be as ephemeral as 1968. Like 1848, this revolution will fail to transform the Muslim world or even just the Arab world. But it will plant seeds that will germinate in the coming decades. I think those seeds will be democratic, but not necessarily liberal. In other words, the democracies that eventually arise will produce regimes that will take their bearings from their own culture, which means Islam.

The West celebrates democracy. It should be careful what it hopes for: It might get it.