martes, 22 de febrero de 2011

A PALESTINIAN VIEW AND AN ISRAELI VIEW


Learn the lessons and Dealing with the legitimacy issue
A PALESTINIAN VIEW
Learn the lessons
Saleh Abdel Jawad
"Too little, too late"--this expression has gained a new reputation in the last 40 days. Events in Tunisia and Egypt and other countries in the Arab world have confirmed the validity of the expression. Arab leaders like Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, eager to calm the protests against their rule, tried to give up minor concessions to the opposition. But it was, as we all know, too late.

Compared with the tired "old guard" leadership (the leaders of Muslim, liberal and leftist parties including the Muslim Brotherhood), the "new guard" generation is not satisfied because it is seeking real change and not minor cosmetic reforms. This applies to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that is nowadays experiencing--silently but steadily--the aftermath of the Mubarak regime earthquake.

The Palestinian cabinet's decision to hold municipal elections at the end of July of this year; the dissolution of Salam Fayyad's government ten days ago; the resignation of Saeb Erekat as chief Palestinian negotiator; and the PLO executive committee's decision to hold legislative and presidential elections by September 2011 are all part of maneuvers and a "strategy" meant to overcome and respond to the new situation in the Arab world and the al-Jazeera leaks scandal.

However, Mahmoud Abbas' and Salam Fayyad's strategy will not succeed--not only because it is "too little, too late"--but because it is irrelevant. First, all political Islamic parties and movements (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizb al-Tahrir) oppose it. As a matter of fact, the opposition to holding legislative and presidential elections is unanimous among the factions save some Fateh circles (considered the "Power Party").

Political parties other than the political Islamists and independent forces without political affiliation (which make up more than 30 percent of the Palestinian political map) and observers consider holding an election before ending the division between Fateh and Hamas as an internalization and reinforcement of this division, which is not only between the two factions but also between Gaza and the West Bank, thus compromising if not ending the Palestinian state national project.

But there are other deeper concerns: all those who are not pro-Palestinian Authority, including the new young Facebook generation, consider elections an attempt by the PA to regain eroded legitimacy at a time when not only is it in question, but also the legitimacy of PLO institutions and the PLO's very capacity to lead the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The leaked documents by al-Jazeera promoted anger but also proved the uselessness of the negotiations process.

International and regional changes (the weakness of the United States, Israeli intransigence, the rise of the "rejection front", and the fall of the Mubarak regime as a main ally of the PA) are all weakening the PA and the current PLO leadership.

Only changes like the election of a new Palestinian National Council (the highest body in the PLO) would set new rules for the game. Ending the political division and rethinking the negotiations are considered a minimum offer to be accepted by the PA.

Most Palestinians today want to return to a situation in which Palestine is considered an entity under occupation, where the right of self-determination and the right to resist are guaranteed. Hard-liners are even announcing the demise of the PA.

This state of mind was strengthened by last week's US veto in the United Nations Security Council. People who thought that the US would reconsider its policies in the region after what happened to its allies know today that the US is crippled by its own internal politics and in the long run will harm its own interests. Unfortunately for Arab dictators, we also have a situation like that of Tunisia and Egypt: leaders incapable of facing the truth and learning the lessons.-Published 21/2/2011 © bitterlemons.org


Saleh Abdel Jawad is a political scientist and dean of the Faculty of Law and Public Administration at Birzeit University.
AN ISRAELI VIEW
Dealing with the legitimacy issue
Ron Pundak
Recent months have witnessed the ongoing success of Palestinian diplomacy. Initiatives taken from the playbook of non-violent struggle have borne fruit in the form of growing international recognition of a Palestinian state and, in parallel, growing support for the Palestinian position as against that of Israel.

This campaign was supposed to reach a new level last Friday with a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the settlement policies of the government of Israel. An American veto, reflecting the dominance of domestic policy over foreign policy in Washington, halted the Palestinian string of victories.

Activism in the international arena has to some extent enabled the Palestinian leadership to rebuff critics who accuse it of doing nothing against occupation and the settlements. The leadership's reply to a second level of criticism--that it is doing nothing to strengthen democracy and legitimacy--took the form last week of a declaration regarding municipal elections in July and elections to parliament and the presidency by September.

To the casual observer it might seem--even if in Ramallah they deny this--that in a different reality it would be more convenient for the Palestinian leadership simply to forget about elections. The "temporary" government appointed in mid-2007 "for the shortest possible duration" has ruled with great success for more than three and a half years without a functioning parliament. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who leads a tiny parliamentary faction, is convenient for all sides, works well with President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and is respected by the donor nations, which trust only him to administer the public coffers. And he has succeeded as a professional administrator to present a new national agenda, to project credibility and integrity and to realize countless urban and rural projects. All in all, he is a credit to the Palestinian people, even if he isn't a member of Fateh.

Still, the protest wave that is sweeping the Arab world threatens the West Bank as well. Clearly something has to be sacrificed, if only to show that "we too are democrats, attuned to the public will, so first we'll hold municipal elections and then we'll move on to parliamentary and presidential elections." Yet when you get down to brass tacks, it emerges that reality is far more complicated than mere declarations and that actually holding elections is problematic.

The polls indicate that Fateh is not growing stronger, while in both the West Bank and Gaza Hamas is not very popular either. If, as matters now stand, Hamas does not participate in elections, it is likely to do everything in its power to prevent them from taking place or at least to void them of any legitimacy. Hamas will not be prepared to forego democratically the near-dictatorial power it has accrued in Gaza, where it is already entrenched. From Hamas' standpoint, democracy will again be relevant when its victory is assured. Since this is currently not the case, the Hamas experience in Gaza has to be defined as one-time democracy.

If Hamas will neither support nor participate in elections, then perhaps the entire purpose of the elections exercise is to weaken it. Abu Mazen's declaration that without Hamas there will be no elections already places the burden of proof on Hamas. There are those in Ramallah who believe that if Hamas avoids elections in Gaza then the public there might rise up against its rulers, just as in Tunisia and Egypt the public took to the streets in the cause of democracy.

On the other hand, a decision to hold elections only in the West Bank encounters the legitimacy issue, which is controversial. Will a new government, emerging from limited elections, be more or less legitimate and successful than the current one? The answer is apparently negative. Yet the present situation is no better. Hovering over this debate is the question whether it will be possible for Fayyad to return as prime minister. Assuming that this time around, like last time, he fails to lead a large parliamentary contingent, then the next prime minister will probably come from the ranks of Fateh.

Apropos Fateh, what will be its electoral agenda or message? The public will no longer buy the old slogans of "ending the occupation, peace, economic development, one gun and one law". This time around, the line will apparently be more nationalistic, more inward-looking, less addressed toward Israel and more toward the significance of events in Egypt and Tunisia. Will that suffice? Apparently not.

Complicated? This is only the tip of the iceberg, since no one, including apparently the man himself, knows whether Abu Mazen will run for another term. A presidential succession struggle will weaken existing coalitions and generate further fragmentation, leading ultimately to a weaker Palestinian political system. All this will come together in September 2011, the deadline for the historic achievement of an independent Palestinian state. All this--against the backdrop of a right-wing Israeli government that fears the wave of instability sweeping the region and that does not welcome any real progress toward a comprehensive solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.-Published 21/2/2011 © bitterlemons.org


Ron Pundak is the director general of the Peres Center for Peace. He was one of the architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement.

lunes, 21 de febrero de 2011

SIN MIEDOS A LAS NUEVAS DEMOCRACIAS ÁRABES


Por mparo Tortosa
Nadie puede seguir especulando a estas alturas que un islamismo oxidado o Al Qaeda están organizando entre bambalinas una revolución en los países árabes. Las manifestaciones son de carácter pacífico, desideologizadas, interclasistas, intergeneracionales, seculares y además introducen un elemento novedoso que es la utilización de los medios digitales. Ni tan siquiera claman contra Occidente o Israel, pues giran entorno a las dos reinvindicaciones más básicas que pueden hacer digno a un pueblo y a su sistema de organización social: mejoras de vida y unas libertades públicas plasmadas a través de un sistema político democrático.

La emergente población árabe, mayoritariamente joven, sin miedo y preparada para afrontar los retos que le espera, ha cambiado los cimientos sobre los que se sustentaba la realpolitik entre Oriente y Occidente, y abre con brío un new age en las relaciones internacionales. Con las revoluciones del mundo árabe la historia no terminó en Berlín, como auguró un profético Fukuyama en los 80, ni padece las fallas que Huntington pronóstico en los 90 (la civilización árabe rechazando los valores democrático y seculares). Hoy la historia se mueve a pasos agigantados y trastoca los cimientos de la realpolitik que consagró Kissinger apoyando a dictaduras satélites servilistas a los intereses de Occidente. A partir de ahora Occidente tendrá que esforzarse por ganarse a estos países con mayor respeto y consideración hacia sus peticiones.

Mantener un status quo como única vía para contener el fastasma del islamismo violento o del terrorismo ya no tiene sentido, tanto en Túnez como en Egipto estaban empezando a penetrar células de Al Qaeda. De hecho, el terrorismo, y sobre todo el de Al Qaeda, se alimenta y sobrevive de Estados fallidos sin control democrático ni libertades. El terrorismo no tiene modo de supervivencia ante sistemas democráticos, donde unos poderes controlan a otros y prima el Estado de derecho. La red de Bin Laden -que asfixiada por el hostigamiento en Afganistán y la recuperación en Irak se ha visto obligada a buscar nuevos hábitats en los Estados frágiles del Sahel- va a encontrarse con un tapón en el norte de África ante las nuevas democracias que se abren paso. Estas son la mejor iniciativa contraterrorista y supera con creces a todas las puestas en marcha hasta la fecha. La democracia deja a Al Qaeda más desarmada que las operaciones de combate.

El régimen de Mubarak alentó un subterfugio islamista al reprimirlo, que ha llenado la ausencia del Estado ante el aumento de las desigualdades (al igual que han hecho Hamás y Hezbolá). Sin embargo, no puede confundirse el islamismo político de los Hermanos Musulmanes, del que han emanado facciones más o menos violentas de acuerdo a los acontecimientos de la historia, con la reciente penetración de células terroristas vinculadas a Al Qaeda. La misma red de Bin Laden ha renegado del islamismo que representan los Hermanos Musulmanes y Hamás. El islamismo político de Al Bana, fundador de esta organización islamista egipcia, era de corte parlamentarista y es de esperar que evolucionen hacia esta vía.

Si con la emergencia de las economías asiáticas, india y brasileña, y el nuevo entedimiento entre EE UU y Rusia en el seno de la nueva estrategia de la OTAN, se está avanzando hacia un mundo multipolar, hoy también deberíamos agregar a las nuevas democracias árabes, que van a reclamar en el futuro su puesto e influencia en las relaciones internacionales.

The Battle of Bahrain King Hamad – the Mubarak of the Gulf


by Justin Raimondo
Of the new revolutionary eruptions, post-Egypt, perhaps the most problematic for Washington is the upsurge in Bahrain, where a Sunni king has long ruled over his predominantly Shi’ite subjects. King Hamad is a corrupt tyrant whose disregard for basic human rights was underscored by the actions of his security forces in storming a protest encampment in the capital city’s main square, murdering 5 protesters in a surprise assault in the dead of night, and wounding over 200. There are indications that at least some of the assailants were Saudis. Bahrain, a small island kingdom in the Persian Gulf, is connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway.
In recent years, the government has bowed to American pressure to at least put on a façade of "democratic" reform, but the changes Hillary Clinton praised in her visit to Bahrain a few months ago were merely cosmetic: theelected parliament is still an advisory body, corruption is pandemic, and citizens have no say in how they are governed or by whom. Indeed, it seems that the much-touted "reform" supposedly undertaken in the country at Washington’s request is merely a façade for political manipulation and high-end thievery. In Bahrain, torture of political dissidents is routine.
The protesters aren’t seeking the overthrow of the al-Khalifa monarchy, as far as I can tell: their demands are limited to the firing of King Hamad’s uncle, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, whose term of office as prime minister has dragged on now for 40 years. Sheikh Khalifa, a major landowner, has come to symbolize the ill-gotten gains of the royal family, which virtually owns the entire country outright. As in Tunisia, where the weight of dictator Ben Ali’s family laid heavily on the country’s sinking fortunes – and as in Egypt, too, where the Mubarak clan had some $70 billion socked away in Swiss bank accounts – resentment over this massive thievery has boiled over into revolution.
However, few premonitions of trouble seem to have ever penetrated the walls of our embassy in Manama, the capital, where our diplomats, as recently as December, 2009, reported that everything was coming up roses. One diplomatic cable, brought to us by Wikileaks, tells us the king is "personable and engaging," and has "overseen the development of strong institutions" — although I doubt the diplomat who wrote that had this in mind. "I’ve just been beaten by a gang of thugs," said ABC reporter Miguel Marquez as he was assaulted by Bahrain government forces — which just about sums up our position in the region, where we are invariably on the side of the thugs.
Bahrain is a key element of the administration’s strategy against Iran: it is the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, and will be the linchpin of any future military action in the Gulf by US forces. Simply put, the Empire cannot afford to lose Bahrain. "Bahrain is a friend and an ally and has been for many years," intones our Secretary of State: "We call on restraint from the government, (and) to keep its commitment to hold accountable those who have utilized excessive force." The King has promised to investigate the killings – which is like Mubarak promising to investigate the killings committed by pro-government thugs in Egypt. Good luck with that, Hillary.
Go here for an overview of the political landscape in Bahrain: in short, the terrain is characterized by a great sectarian divide between the Sunni elite and the Shi’ite majority. Shi’ites claim that the government discriminates against them in public sector employment, business regulation, and the granting of housing subsidies. The opposition demands a revised constitution, to be written and voted on by a body of elected delegates.
They also claim the government is bringing in Sunnis from outside Bahrain and granting them citizenship in order to bolster the ruling elite’s political base: the country is less than 30 percent Sunni.
Bahrain has been a more compliant puppet than even Mubarak’s Egypt: while Wikileaks cables from Cairo complained that the Egyptian military still seems to consider Israel its principal enemy, US diplomats in Manama report no such ambiguity in Bahrain’s ruling circles. The Bahraini government was the first Arab country to send an ambassador to "liberated" Iraq, and US officials have praised them for cuuddling up to the Israelis. King Hamad has been agitating for a US attack on Iran almost as strenuously as the Israelis, albeit less publicly. On a visit to the country, General David Petraeus met with the King, who, according to a US diplomatic cable,
"Pointed to Iran as the source of much of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. ‘That program must be stopped,’ he said. ‘The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it.’ King Hamad added that in light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance’s request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed."
The US is going to need this kind of political support, as well as the strategic military advantage afforded by Bahrain in any future conflict with Iran. Yet in the wake of the Pearl Square massacre, and the continuing crackdown, the price for that support is going to be rather high – so high that it hardly seems worth paying. On another visit by Petraeus, in which he met with the king, Hamad is reported to have said:
"Bahrain had received a message from Iranian FM Mottaki, urging regional governments to support the efforts of Iran, Iraqi insurgents, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban and Syria to drive American forces from the Gulf. The King commented: &With friends like these, who needs enemies?"
US diplomats might now turn the king’s question back on him, and ask: with friends like you, who needs enemies?
Perhaps anticipating this, it looks like the King had his alibi ready as far back as 2008, when the meeting took place:
"King Hamad related the report that Bahrainis were receiving training from Hezbollah in Lebanon, but admitted he had no definitive proof. He also speculated that the Syrian government was complicit, and must be helping these Bahrainis travel without passport verification as tourists."
Expect any day now to hear that Hezbollah – Bahrain’s stand-in for the Muslim Brotherhood — is behind what’s happening in the country. In that case, refer to the appended comment in the WikiLeaked diplomatic cable, which reads:
"Post has heard versions of this theory from Bahraini officials in the past, but despite our requests the GOB has been unable to provide convincing evidence."
The rebellion in Bahrain is a dagger pointed at the heart of the War Party’s campaign against Iran, and more: it is a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the House of Saud. Right across the King Fahd causeway,in the oil-rich Eastern province, are as many as two million Shi’ites, who live and work atop the world’s greatest concentration of oil reserves and around 90 percent of Saudi oil production. The predominantly Shi’ite workers who work those oil fields are the key to the Kingdom’s wealth and future stability, and the Saudi kleptocrats cannot afford to let a Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain succeed.
Bahrain – and Saudi Arabia – are the weak underbelly of the elaborate US security structure in the region. In place since Franklin Delano Roosevelt cemented the US alliance with the House of Saud, in 1943, it may all be coming undone – and in very short order.

Nationalism, Democracy, and the Arab Awakening The difference between Egypt and Iran


by Justin Raimondo
The revolutionary wave sweeping through the Middle East promises to topple sclerotic Arab regimes throughout the region, but there is a marked difference between, say, Egypt and Iran – and the difference is the nationalist factor.

In Egypt, the people rose up against a US-supported dictatorship which had ridden on their backs for 30 years. It’s interesting to note that the regime, in the latter stages of the revolt, resorted to dark hints that the protesters were being run by mysterious “foreign elements.” And, indeed, there was a foreign element that played a key role – I would argue the key role – in Egyptian politics, and had been doing so for the past 30 years, albeit not on the side of the pro-democracy forces: namely, the US government. Washington gave over $60 billion in mostly military aid to the regime of Hosni Mubarak, enabling him to stay in power far longer than he would have otherwise managed.

Not only that, but this massive outpouring of dollars effectively handed control of the nation’s economic life to the military, which now controls as much as 30 percent of Egypt’s gross domestic product. Internal US government communications, revealed by the invaluable WikiLeaks, show diplomats complaining about the Egyptian military’s resistance to economic liberalization, but Washington failed to comprehend how US policy entrenched the military high command as a major player in the Egyptian economy.

Mubarak’s appeal to nationalist sympathies failed because he, and not the protesters, was seen as the agent of a foreign power: namely, the United States. While economic and internal political factors almost certainly sparked the upsurge, it was nationalism – in part energized by resentment of the dictator’s American patrons – that managed to sustain it and ultimately carry it forward to victory. Protesters carried Egyptian flags, and appealed directly to the army as the protector of the nation against Mubarak. In Bahrain, too, the protesters carried their national flag, and made an appeal to the military – this latter with decidedly deadly results. In any case, however, the nationalistic sentiment exuded by the pro-democracy forces is a defining feature of the most successful uprisings – to date, Egypt and Bahrain – while in Iran (and, to some extent, Libya) the situation is more complex.

What complicates the picture in the case of Iran, for example, is outside pressure on the regime by the US, which reinforces actual grassroots support for the ruling elite and retards the growth of the opposition. The American and Israeli-led international campaign to isolate Iran on the grounds that it has no right to obtain nuclear power is opposed by both the mullahs and the “Green” movement that is trying to overthrow the dictatorship. If the Greens took power tomorrow, Iran’s nuclear program, such as it is, would remain in place – as would the hostility of the West and the sanctions that are slowly strangling ordinary people in that country.

In Iran, the elections in which the opposition was allowed to compete did not give the Green movement a victory. While some may allege that these elections were far from fair, this evaluation is not clear-cut enough to dislodge the legitimacy of the regime: and, in any event, it is undeniable that the hard-liners enjoy some level of popular support, or at least enough to forestall a massive upsurge such as threw Mubarak out of office in 18 days.

The Iranian regime can credibly point to a systematic campaign to undermine the country on the part of the Western powers, chiefly the United States – including a terrorist campaign waged by the US-backed Jundallah organization, a radical Sunni insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan that has launched vicious attacks on civilian targets. This cements popular support for the mullah-ocracy, which is seen as the only alternative to foreign domination and chaos.

The nationalist factor – or, one might say, the anti-American factor – operates in a similar manner in Libya, where longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi appeared in person at a pro-government rally in the capital city of Tripoli, which has been relatively calm and where the protest movement is apparently weakest. One cannot imagine Yemen’s “President” Ali Abdullah Saleh feeling confident enough to make an appearance in Sana’s main square, where he might well end up on the wrong end of a hangman’s noose.

Another US protectorate, the tiny East African nation of Djibouti, witnessed an amazing 20,000 protesters taking to the streets – a massive outpouring in a country with a population of under one million. Djibouti is the site of a major military base which is an important anchor of US operations in the region and beyond. In return, Washington has poured in aid and given the regime of “President” Ismail Guelleh political support, overlooking the Mubarak-like familial despotism that rules over this small but strategically important enclave. The President’s family has ruled the African city-state since independence from France in 1977.

In Syria, on the other hand, the Arab Awakening is less advanced: the Syrian Ba’athist regime of Bashar al-Assad has been in Washington’s sights since the Bush era, and here again the nationalist factor plays an important role. Of course, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, once decimated a city of some 60,000, slaughtering most of the inhabitants, when the Muslim Brotherhood launched a revolt, and the memory of this may deter potential rebels: but that kind of brutality is less of a restraining factor these days, as we have seen in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, where security forces are firing directly into crowds – and still the ranks of protesters continue to grow.

The US government poses as the international champion of democracy and liberty, but the objective real-world consequences of its foreign policy of global intervention effectively hold back progress in this direction. It is no accident that the revolutions in Iran, Libya, and Syria (where only a few hundred have so far turned out for Egypt-inspired protests) are meeting substantial resistance, while in the US protectorates – Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Djibouti – the protests are more successful.

Unless the administration is willing to take advice from the more embittered neocons, Glenn Beck, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who rail that Mubarak was “betrayed” by the West, this disparity points to the only rational response to the Awakening by the US: Washington must get out of the way. Amid calls from many liberals and some neocons to endorse the democratic movements, and the opposite advice from the Beckians, the US government must resist the temptation to meddle in any manner whatsoever – and this includes pumping in money and resources to handpicked “democratic” parties and organizations via USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy. Such efforts are bound to boomerang, just as our previous support to the reigning dictators did.

Our national interests were never served by supporting brutal kleptocrats like Mubarak, and his cousins across the region: nor are they being served by “democracy promotion,” either. The Founders foresaw that the American example would inspire efforts to achieve liberty beyond our shores, and one of them, John Quincy Adams, had this advice to give:

“Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”

UPDATE: As events in Libya continue to race forward, I think my initial analysis is roughly accurate: while the Eastern provinces have rid themselves of Gadhafi, in Tripoli pro-government mobs are taking to the streets, and the dictator and his equally daffy son seem to be digging in for a protracted conflict. I see the son is taking his clues from Glenn Beck and David Horowitz, babbling about how the rebels are trying to restore the "Caliphate" or "Emirate." I didn’t know they got Fox News in Libya, but I guess being the son of a dictator affords one certain privileges.

NOTES IN THE MARGIN

Antiwar.com’s Spring fundraising drive is in full swing, and, in spite of a slow start, seems to have picked up a bit. But the truth of the matter is that it hasn’t picked up enough. If we continue to receive contributions at the current rate, we’ll be well short of the sum – $100,000 – we need to continue at our current level. This is a disaster in the making.

It’s a disaster because, for the first time, we are beginning to take a more activist orientation and are making substantial inroads. A good example is our recent intervention at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), where we had a literature table –- and where a large number of anti-war libertarians and conservatives managed to make their presence felt. Both Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were greeted by activists wearing Antiwar.com buttons and stickers with cries of “war criminal!” and “Where’s Osama bin Laden?!” That’s how we demoralize the enemy and make him afraid – even in what he regards as his own lair.

There’s no doubt about it: Antiwar.com has influenced and inspired a whole new generation of antiwar activists – but we can’t continue to do that without your financial support. We have always depended on our readers – who give an average donation of around $50 – to keep us going. We don’t have any really big contributors, or “sugar daddies,” who fill our coffers when they go empty. I’m sure both George Soros and the Koch brothers would not be all that displeased if we took down our shingle and stole quietly away into the night. That’s because we’re explicitly and deliberately non-partisan, targeting both “major” parties for their crimes in the foreign policy realm, and their bipartisan support for our wrong-headed policy of global intervention.

There’s really no more important area in which independent journalism must be allowed to carve out a space for itself and flourish than in the realm of foreign policy. There are so many interests – both political and economic – that have a hand in keeping the Empire afloat that editorial independence is a must in this area. That’s why we’ve done our utmost to build up a grassroots network of supporters, to whom we can turn when we have to.

Well, now is the time for our supporters to come forward – to dig deep in this time of economic dislocation and uncertainty – and give us the financial means to continue. We don’t want to make major cutbacks in our coverage and our activism at such a crucial time, but we’ll have no choice if we don’t make our very modest goal. It’s as simple as that.

So please, I’m asking my readers to give as much as they can as soon as they can. Because –and the world – depends on it.

sábado, 19 de febrero de 2011

ENTREVISTA A SASKIA SASSEN, AUTORA DE: “LA CIUDAD GLOBAL”

Emergen dos actores estratégicos. La ciudad global representa un momento en la trayectoria del capital globalizado donde ese capital tan electrónico, poderoso, elusivo, invisible, se vuelve hombres y mujeres, y se convierte en una necesidad de edificios y de infraestructura. En tanto, se vuelve hombres y mujeres que lo quieren todo en el circuito de las oficinas de producción y también en el circuito de reproducción social: sus estilos de vida, sus casas, etcétera. Esa fuerza enorme, privada, se materializa. Se vuelve, hablando en términos marxistas, fuerza social; una fuerza social muy distinta de la vieja burguesía.
Junto a ésta, hay una segunda fuerza social emergente: un nuevo plantel de trabajadores, que no son los antiguos sindicados, y que incluye empleados muy vulnerables, a menudo migrantes o inmigrantes, mujeres, ciudadanos minimizados (como los negros, en Nueva York, o los argelinos, en Francia). Trabajadores desprotegidos, que ocupan una posición sistémica en estas ciudades globales, porque también son parte de las dinámicas de la globalización; no todos pero sí muchos. Ellos también logran emerger, forman esa especie de lo que Marx llamaba el Lumpen, aunque conforma un error verlo como tal, ya que constituyen una nueva fuerza social.
¿Cómo conviven estas dos fuerzas sociales?
La pregunta que yo me hago es en qué momento estas dos fuerzas sociales se encuentran en combate político. Porque no hay mucho de esto, hay mucha opresión, mucha desigualdad, explotación, pero combate… Las luchas son, más bien, micro-sociales, donde hay mucho anarquismo: los que ocupan casas; la defensa de sectores de bajo nivel social para que sus espacios no se vuelvan apartamentos de lujo, lo cual implicaría su desplazamiento; la lucha contra policías que intentan limpiar una parte de la ciudad para que se vuelva más manejable para un nuevo circuito social, como ocurrió en Río de Janeiro o Sao Paulo. Ésas, para mí, son micro-luchas políticas donde este capital globalizado se confronta. Hay un momento político ahí, que incluye a esa parte de la sociedad que Marx hubiera llamado Lumpen pero que aquí se vuelven actores políticos. Y muchas de las formas de violencia que vemos en la ciudad, que llamamos violencia urbana porque no es como la violencia del robo o del asesinato, expresan esa lucha política. La ciudad global conforma un espacio que también genera esos actores políticos, no simplemente refiere a un aspecto de la economía global.
Cabe preguntarse sobre si la aparición de estos nuevos actores políticos exigen una reformulación de las instituciones de gobierno.
En muchas de estas ciudades, el gobierno no se ha comportado brillantemente. Pascual Maragall, en su etapa como alcalde de Barcelona, supo cómo manejar esto: si bien no eliminó la desigualdad, la manejó de una manera que permitió una redistribución de los beneficios. La Buenos Aires de los 90, donde hubo un dinamismo económico espectacular a nivel urbano, generó una miseria en las viejas clases medias. Esto es: surgió un plantel de profesionales de mucho ingreso, se embelleció y renovó parte de la estructura de la ciudad, pero no hubo distribución de beneficios. Mientras que en Barcelona se supo cómo redistribuir para que también los sectores populares pudieran extraer alguna ventaja de ese enorme dinamismo que se dio en los últimos 20 años en estas ciudades. Ése es uno de los grandes problemas de gobiernos nacionales y locales, dependiendo de qué parte del mundo se está hablando. Y responde a que los políticos no entienden casi nunca las dinámicas urbanas.
¿OTRA GLOBALIZACION ES POSIBLE?

Las desigualdades de la globalización neoliberal son cada vez mayores. El sociólogo catalán Manuel Castells dice que si se sigue esta tendencia terminaremos viviendo en universos paralelos. ¿Exagera?
Ya hay un poco de esto. De hecho, la ciudad global no es la descripción de toda una ciudad, sino un modelo analítico que trata de captar ciertas dinámicas urbanas estratégicas y los espacios en los cuales éstas se materializan. Así, hay muchas partes de la ciudad que no aparecen en esas dinámicas, casos muy extremos, como el barrio Bronx, en Nueva York, donde la miseria es enorme. Pero opino muy diferente a Castells, con quien en muchas cosas coincido, en cuanto a que, volviendo a la función política, encuentro que algunas de estas clases de trabajadores, medias lumpen, tienen una posición sistémica dentro del espacio económico que conforma la ciudad global. Un lugar que los posiciona como actores políticos, como parte del capitalismo avanzado globalizado. Como el código que utilizamos no nos permite captar esta conexión, hay que refutar el código. ¿Cómo el inmigrante que no habla inglés en Nueva York puede ser parte del sector avanzado? ¿Cómo puede serlo del sector globalizado? Y sí, puede serlo. De hecho, lo es. Pero para entenderlo hay que trazar cuáles son los circuitos que conectan estos mundos económicos con las finanzas globalizadas. Entonces, aunque parecen ser mundos paralelos, forman todos parte del capitalismo actual, y que en la ciudad global asume su forma más avanzada.
Existe un discurso muy fuerte que señala que la globalización es un proceso «inevitable». Y sus detractores la explican como una excusa que ayuda a los peces gordos del mercado a concentrar poder. ¿Otra globalización, más justa, es posible?
Emergente una globalización de sectores sociales donde se ubican los movimientos de Porto Alegre, los activistas del medio ambiente, los de los derechos humanos… Emerge una globalización que es política, de resistencia, de ciertas formas de acción política, pero también de acción social, de acción legal. Hay una serie de proyectos sociales, cívicos, de ley; mucho de lo que se está haciendo en el ámbito nacional es una forma de globalización político-legal-cívica que contesta al neoliberalismo, que lo resiste. Y que, a su vez, se siente como global, no como anti-global, sino como lo que ahora llamamos la otra globalización. Y es muy importante reconocerlo.
Otro tipo de globalización que permite esperanzarse…
Sí. Ahora bien, también hay otra globalización, u tercer tipo, que es criminal. La de los traficantes de drogas, los de personas, el terrorismo internacional organizado. Mafias que usan las infraestructuras de la globalización para sus objetivos. Hay, al menos, tres globalizaciones muy poderosas. La más, la que domina, es la económica neoliberal. Pero yo creo que ningún poder formalizado —y esta economía está bastante formalizada a través de las políticas que todos los países participantes en ella han trazado, y que facilitan y permiten la existencia de mercados y empresas globales, porque eso no cayó del cielo—, ningún gran poder formalizado duró para siempre. Con excepción de la Iglesia Católica, claro, que parece que no deja de durar. No lo hizo, el Imperio Británico, tampoco el Norteamericano, y no lo hará este modelo tan brutal que está destruyendo a más de cincuenta economías. Es un sistema muy poderosa, sí, pero no va a durar para siempre, al menos bajo esta modalidad. Eso sí, habrá otras que serán igualmente poderosas, igualmente destructivas. La dinámica puede desarrollarse, por ejemplo, en la dirección de generar espacios protegidos. Hace 10 años muchos me preguntaban acerca de la posibilidad de que el mundo se desarticule, por un lado, en una serie de ciudades privilegiadas y, por otro, en una especie de desastre. Eso es posible, seguramente la peor modalidad.
Quedan inevitablemente rezagadas las numerosas ciudades que no cumplen los requisitos para adaptarse a esta economía globalizada.
Una ciudad global paga un costo social alto, ojo. Lo global trae mucho dinamismo pero también plantea un gran desafío de administración. O sea, que no es simplemente una fórmula para que todos estemos contentos. Por otra parte, hay muchas modalidades por medio de las cuales sobreviven esas aglomeraciones urbanas, las pequeñas, las no globales, a las que hace referencia en su pregunta. Y es que la economía globalizada es una parte muy pequeña de la economía total; una parte con gran poder, estratégica, sí, pero que existe junto a otra mucho mayor de actividades localizadas, regionalizadas, de ámbito nacional. Un ejemplo es el turismo de alta clase, como el de La Habana, en Cuba, donde las inversiones extranjeras han generado un espacio para viajeros de alto nivel. Y hay muchas otras tácticas, algunas muy buenas, otras no tanto, que se están usando y que encajan dentro de circuitos internacionales. A la par, hay ciudades que están sufriendo. En Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, algunas urbes se están empequeñeciendo, como ocurre con Detroit, que ha perdido capacidad económica y en la cual hay espacios que se vacían.
¿Coincide en que existe un discurso mediático que tiende a endiosar una imagen parcial de ciudad global? Un discurso interesado, quizá impulsado por sectores de poder que sacan ventaja de las dinámicas económicas que se dan en estas ciudades.
Sí, pero también hay mucha multivalencia en todo esto: no se puede hablar, simplemente, en términos de bueno o malo. Depende del manejo político de la situación. Una ciudad global puede abrir paso a un dinamismo económico enorme y generar dinamismos políticos muy interesantes; las luchas mismas son interesantes. El espacio de la ciudad globalizada es un espacio que está muy despierto, enérgico. Por eso me importa capturar las posibilidades políticas que se dan en ellos; el hecho de que el capital globalizado se vuelva fuerza social, que uno la pueda combatir. Es verdad que el discurso mediático ha generado imágenes de bellos edificios, bellos restaurantes, gente bien vestida, y se a transformado en una especie de mercado a través del cual se vende la imagen de las ciudades. Lo cual nos lleva al principio esta entrevista: existe un manejo simbólico del vocabulario.
Obras de la autora con traducción al castellano
1 Movilidad trabajo y capital : estudio sobre la corriente internacional de la inversión y del trabajo Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Trabajo. (1992).
2. La Ciudad Global. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA. 1996.
3. ¿Perdiendo el control? : la soberanía en la era de la globalización. Edicions Bellaterra, S.A. (2001)
4 . Contra geografías de la globalización: género y ciudadanía en los circuitos transfronterizos. Traficantes de Sueños. (2003).
5. Estragos de la Globalización. Buenos Aires. Fondo de Cultura Economica. 2004.
5. Inmigrantes, Colonos y Refugiados. Madrid: Siglo XXI. 2004.

Nuevas Tecnologías y el 'poder de los sin poder'


SASKIA SASSEN, SOCIÓLOGA
POR PABLO ROMERO

BARCELONA.- Saskia Sassen, investigadora social y considerada una de las cinco máximas autoridades mundiales sobre la Sociedad de la Información, analiza en el Navegante conceptos como las divisiones sociales, el control de las tecnologías y las nuevas fuerzas sociales, tan contrapuestas como los activismos pacifistas o las redes terroristas, que han encontrado un eco importante de la Red, para preguntarse finalmente acerca del 'poder de los sin poder'.

Nacida en Holanda, vivió 14 años en Argentina y actualmente está establecida en EEUU. es una reputada especialista en asuntos urbanos, actualmente profesora de Sociología en la Universidad de Chicago y profesora invitada en la London School of Economics, Reino Unido. Se volvió conocida internacionalmente luego de publicar su obra seminal – La Ciudad Global, en 1991 (Princeton University Press), reeditada y revisada en 2001

El Navegante tuvo la oportunidad de realizar una entrevista a Saskia Sassen.


P.- Vivimos en un mundo en el que las nuevas tecnologías nos imponen tener una identidad digital. ¿Estamos preparados?

R.-Bueno, sí y no. Por un lado, sí, porque existe el concepto de identidad digital casi como imaginario. La gente que aún no la tiene, especialmente en el primer mundo, tiene un imaginario en torno a ese concepto. Y no, porque en realidad es un proceso en formación, una buena parte de la gente sólo asume su identidad digital como un juego, sólo la vertiente lúdica, en los videojuegos, o en los juegos sexuales, o cuando pretenden ser una persona que no son (el hombre viejo que pretende ser un jovencito)...

P.-Como en ciertos chats...

R.-Exacto, los chats. En realidad, creo que es un tema mucho más profundo que ese nivel un poco lúdico. Yo creo que hay un sector que ya tiene identidad digital, y tenemos datos sobre eso. Y es un sector muy interesante, ya que entre ellos se da una interactividad y una confianza muy fluida en el mundo digital, y cuando esa gente se conoce en persona las relaciones son más difíciles. O sea, miembros de grupos que han trabajado juntos, como grupos de activistas, disponen de una identidad digital, y al conocerse físicamente (identidad real) puede llegar a caer mucho la comunicación y el interés

P.- Parece que las instituciones fomentan el tener una identidad digital (firma electrónica, por ejemplo), porque cada vez es más necesario, pero desde el punto de vista social ¿es un complemento a la identidad 'real', o es también una imposición?


R.- Bueno, es que el concepto varía muchísimo. Por un lado, tenemos a grupos que realizan interacciones puramente digitales, que cuando se conocen en la realidad la interacción digital sufre un poco, ya no hay tanto interés como antes. Esto me indica que existe una identidad digital para cada uno que propicia relaciones muy fáciles y agradables, y que parece que no conviene tratar de conocer físicamente a la otra persona. Yo, como activista política y como investigadora, tengo toda una serie de interacciones con otra gente únicamente a nivel digital, y es lo más cómodo: no me interesa conocer a los demás (risas). No quiero entrar en toda la profundidad que implica reconocer la cara, los gestos... de la otra persona. Para mí, eso es una identidad digital.

Ahora bien, por otro lado, creo que la idea de la gente no es esa, la gente aún no ha comprendido la idea. No obstante, creo que se va a dar un fenómeno muy interesante en la ciudad, y que es que estas tecnologías, diseñadas sobre todo para comunicaciones a largas distancias, cuando son usadas en el ámbito local, son un instrumento que generan comunidades en nuestras sociedades urbanas — que son un poco anárquicas, quizá demasiado grandes—. Pero eso no es identidad digital, sino la consecución de una sensación de pertenencia a una comunidad a través de interacciones digitales. Esto genera unos efectos muy positivos. Un ejemplo claro son las comunidades gay.

Israel es visto hoy por casi todos los árabes como colonialista, el estado anti-árabe que oprime a los palestinos y si puede desposeer a tantos árabes como sea posible mejor. Pero no es así y también muchos sienten admiración por los logros de Israel.
Pero cuando pueblos enteros se levantan como hoy día en Medio Oriente, todas las actitudes arraigadas pueden cambiar y arrasar con las viejas ideas. Si los líderes políticos del establishment israelí pudieran declarar abiertamente su solidaridad con las masas árabes en su lucha por la libertad, la justicia y la dignidad, es posible plantar una semilla que daría sus frutos en los próximos años y no muy lejanos. El pueblo de Israel ya lo hizo.
Carlos Braverman
Tel Aviv Israel
19 de febrero de 2011